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Convention dictates that the author of a law review article have no
personal stake in the article lest he be too emotionally involved and lose his
objectivity.His exposure to the human toll that a senseless legal proposition
may have imposed is deemed irrelevant. What counts is whether the
proposition is, in the dry vernacular of Socratic logic, invalid or at least
unsound. This Article departs from that convention by placing a very
personal face on the wrenching consequences and absurdities that flowed
from a legal proposition (herein called the "per se board meeting rule")
that, I submit, is both invalid and unsound. This Article's purpose,
however, is not to vindicate the victims. Rather, its purpose is to set the
rule in a real life situation to dramatize the need to correct a misconception
of the law that makes a mockery of Florida's judicial processes and
undermines effective representative government in the State.
I.BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2 000, a grand jury indicted Richard Aldrich (Aldrich) and
Allen Seed (Seed), two elected trustees of the Indian River County Hospital
District (District), for knowingly violating title 19, Section 286.011 of the
Florida Statutes (Sunshine Law).The grand jury charged that Aldrich and
Seed violated the Sunshine Law by meeting in private with Rock Tonkel
(Tonkel), the District's executive director, and Donna Skinner (Skinner},
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another District trustee, and discussing matters pending before the District's
governing body (District Board).1 The charges could have resulted in
imprisonment.2
The Sunshine Law, enacted in 1967, provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or
authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision, ... at which official acts are to
be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all
I. Florida v. Seed, No. New 00-369 (19th Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (indicting Seed for violation
of the Sunshine Law). The count against Seed read in relevant part that on or about August 19,
1999, Seed did
knowingly violate the provisions of Florida Statute Section 286.011(3)(b) by
attending a meeting not held in accordance with the provisions of Florida Statute
286.011(1) & (2), and discussing subject matter that could foreseeably come
before the Indian River County Hospital District Board ofTrustees; in violation
of Florida Statute 286.011(3)(b).
An identical count was brought against Aldrich. Florida v. Aldrich, No. New 00-370 (19th Fla.
Cir. Ct. 2000) (indicting Aldrich for violation of the Sunshine Law). Aldrich was also charged
with a second Sunshine Law violation in connection with a meeting that occurred on or between
the dates ofJuly 1, 1999 and August 31, 1999. Id. The charges were dropped before Aldrich found
out when this alleged meeting occurred or what it was about.
2. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2000). Subsections (2) and (3) of the Sunshine Law read as
follows:
(2) The minutes of a meeting of any such board or commission of any such state
agency or authority shall be promptly recorded, and such records shall be open
to public inspection. The circuit courts of this state shall have jurisdiction to
issue injunctions to enforce the purposes of this section upon application by any
citizen of this state.
(3)(a) Any public officer who violates any provision of this section is guilty of
a noncriminal infraction, punishable by fine not exceeding $5Q0.
(b) Any person who is a member of a board or commission or of any state
agency or authority ofany county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision
and who knowingly violates the provisions ofthis section by attending a meeting
not held in accordance with the provisions hereof is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
(c) Conduct which occurs outside the state which would constitute a knowing
violation of this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
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times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered
binding except as taken or made at such meeting. The board or
commission must provide reasonable notice of all such meetings.3
Beyond the bare language cited above, there is no provision in the Sunshine
Law that states its purpose, and no documented legislative history that
elucidates such purpose, other than a prior open meeting law that applied
only to cities and towns and a Florida Supreme Court case interpreting that
law.4 Laying aside for the moment the prior law and court case, the only
purpose one can safely infer from the Sunshine Law is that the Legislature
intended to prohibit secret meetings of public boards.
The meeting giving rise to the indictments of Aldrich and Seed occurred
over dinner, following a regular meeting of the District Board. Although
there is a dispute as to whether they ever discussed any pending District
business at the dinner, the facts are clear that:
The dinner meeting was a spontaneous get together the primary,
if not sole, purpose of which was social in nature;
11. Aldrich, Seed and Skinner did not constitute a quorum of the
District Board;
iii. Neither the District Board, nor any quorum of the District Board,
ever established a committee composed of, or authorized the
meeting of, or otherwise delegated authority to, Aldrich and
Seed, or Aldrich, Seed, and Skinner, to discuss the matters
allegedly discussed at the dinner meeting;
iv. The dinner meeting was not part of a collaborative undertaking
of the District Board (or any quorum thereof) to circumvent the
open meeting requirement of the Sunshine Law by, for example,
1.

3. FLA . STAT. § 286.01 I (2000).
4. FLA. STAT.§ 165.22 (1%9); Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950). For a detailed
discussion see Ruth M. Barnes, Government in the Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?, 23 FLA. L.
REV. 361-62 (1971). The only legislative history adduced by the author was a series of
amendments that were considered but had no bearing on the overall intent of the Sunshine Law,
nor on what the Legislature meant by the term "meetings of any board or commission." The author
did, however, state, based on interviews with two state legislators who supported the bill creating
the Sunshine Law, that the bill's supporters "felt that certain state and local practices. manifested
in closed meetings and behind-the-scenes manipulation, indicated an urgent need for abolition of
secretive government practices," and that "without media influence and pressure [the bill] mi�t
never have survived committee action." Id. No examples were given of such "secretive
government practices." Id. Though inconclusive, this kind of anecdotal evidence is hardly
legislative history upon which a court could rely. This point is tellingly underscored in subsequent
interviews of one of the two legislators, Senator J. Emory Cross, who denounced the per se board
meeting rule criticized in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 84 & 85.
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subdividing into smaller groups in order to secretly forge a
majority position on the District business allegedly discussed at
the dinner.
In the Grand Jury's Interim Report, dated March 9, 2000, the grand jury
made clear that for purposes of the indictments it treated, "any gathering of
two or more members of the same board, outside of a properly noticed
public meeting, to discuss some matter which will foreseeably come before
that board for . ..action" as a violation of the Sunshine Law.5 This
characterization of a Sunshine Law violation assumes that such a gathering,
whether or not sanctioned by the board is, ipso facto, a meeting of that
board within the meaning of the Sunshine Law (the per se board meeting
rule).Under such a rule, the above stated facts are no defense for an alleged
infraction of the Sunshine Law, other than perhaps the more punitive
infraction of knowingly violating that law under Section 286.011(3)(b).
Driven by the logic of the per se board meeting rule, the Grand Jury
Report also took Skinner and Tonkel to task for not stopping the discussion
or reporting the matter to law enforcement agents.The Grand Jury Report
even castigated Dr. Broadus Sowell, chair of the District Board, for not
taking similar action or at least hanging up when another trustee phoned
him concerning some Hospital District business. The grand jury found,
however, there to be no evidence that Dr. Sowell participated in "telephone
calls ...to the extent that he was in violation of the Sunshine Laws. "6
Eventually, the prosecutor dropped all criminal charges, including
related felony perjury charges.7 In exchange Aldrich and Seed pled nolo
contendere to a noncriminal infraction of the Sunshine Law. This resolution
occurred only after Aldrich and Seed had been arrested, had their mug shots
taken, were finger printed, jailed, pilloried in the press, and subjected to
considerable emotional turmoil and huge defense costs.Neither defendant
was prepared to endure the uncertainty and additional expense of a jury trial
and possible appeal. The threat of a criminal conviction, however remote,
was simply too much to bear.8
5. Grand Jury Interim, 1 Report (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000).
6. Id at 2-3. It is clear that, under the per se board meeting rule, Skinner and Sowell would
have also been indicted for Sunshine Law violations but for the lack of sufficient evidence that
they participated in discussions about District Board business. Tonkel escaped indictment because
he was a District employee and not a District Board trustee. Id.
7. Assistant State Attorney Chris Taylor was quoted in the local newspaper as stating that
"the evidence doesn't support (an) intentional act." Adam.Chrzan, Two Take Pleas, VERO BEACH
PREss J., June 24, 2000, at Al.
8. After the criminal charges were dropped, Aldrich and Seed asked the District to
reimburse them for the legal expenses they incurred in defending themselves. The District Board,
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If the prosecutor had not dismissed the criminal charges, Seed would
have brought a motion to dismiss the Sunshine Law violation charge on the
grounds, inter alia, that even assuming he and Aldrich discussed pending
District business at the dinner, the gathering was not a meeting within the
purview of the Sunshine Law.9 This Article sets forth the reasons for such
a motion.
At this point the reader may be tempted to stop, and without reading on,
dismiss this Article as the slanted rantings ofan outraged brother unfamiliar
with Florida law and hostile to the Sunshine Law. The author pleads guilty
to outrage. Hopefully this Article will show that he is only too familiar with
Florida law. As for the Sunshine Law, the author unreservedly supports it.
The public, and yes, the media are entitled to be made privy to the collective
deliberations of public board members whenever they act on behalf of that
governing body, whether they conduct themselves as a quorum of that body
or of any committee, subcommittee, or other gathering authorized by the
governing body to act on its behalf. 10 It should make no difference whether
such action is formal or informal, preliminary in nature or binding upon the
board as a whole.
However, an open meeting requirement should not suppress private one
on-one consultations between and among board members when they have
no authority, either individually or collectively, to act on the board's behalf
concerning the matters discussed. The per se board meeting rule has such
an effect, and, as more fully discussed in this Article, this rule neither serves
the public benefit, nor comports with any common sense understanding of
what is meant by a board meeting under the Sunshine Law.
What is most astounding about the per se board meeting rule is its
genesis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Florida Supreme Court has
never approved the rule in any definitive holding. The rule was instead born
of unsupported dicta of an activist Florida Supreme Court Justice that was
disowned by a majority of the Court but embraced by the media and the
State Attorney General. It was nurtured by tortured reasoning and case law
denial. It eventually gained a life of its own once a District Court of Appeal,
in a bizarre opinion, implicitly adopted the rule as the law of the land,
by a 4-3 vote, refused the request on the grounds that the District Board had not authorized the
meeting in question. HenryA. Stephens, Trustees Deny Seed's Legal Fees, VERO BEACH PREss
J., Sept. 23, 2000, at A3. The Board later reversed itself by a 6-1 vote when Aldrich sued the
District and agreed with Seed to settle any reimbursement claim for SO cents on the dollar. Henry
A. Stephens, Hospital District Agrees to Pay Part ofFees, VERO BEACH PREss J., Apr. 22, 200 l,
atA3.
9. FLA. STAT.§ 286.01 l(2)(b).
l 0. ThisArticle does not discuss what kind offormal board discussions should be exempted
from the Sunshine Law. That is a matter properly left for the Legislature to decide.
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notwithstanding that two other District Courts of Appeal had held to the
contrary.
Although all fifty states have enacted open meeting laws, only one other
state appears to have adopted the per se board meeting rule. 11 That state,
Colorado, did so in express statutory terms, 12 but only as applied to state
boards and commissions.A careful review, in chronological order, of the
applicable legislative history and case law surrounding the Sunshine Law
reveals that Florida also is not, and should not be, bound by a per se board
meeting rule.
II. CASE LAW UNDER PRIOR LAW

A. 1905

Florida Statutes, 1967, Chapter 165.22 (the Prior Law), enacted in
1905, was the law in effect when the Sunshine Law was adopted in 1967. 13
The Prior Law provided in relevant part, "All meetings ofany city or town
council or any board of alderman of any city or town in the state, shall be
held open to the public of any such city or town ...." 14 This law contained
a fine or imprisonment enforcement provision.15 Not until 1950 was there
any published court case interpreting the Prior Law.16
l 1. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Tapping Official's Secrets (4th ed.
2001), available at http://www.rcfp.org./tapping (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
According to Tapping, 33 of the remaining 49 states require, mostly by statute and some by
judicial interpretation, that a quorum of the board members meet before there can be a meeting
of the board under the respective open meeting laws. The only case cited in Tapping from another
state that interprets board meetings in a manner remotely close to the per se board meeting rule
is Mayor ofEl Dorado v. El Dorado Broadcasting Co., which held, over a vigorous dissent, that
"meetings formal or informal . .. of the governing bodies" include any meeting of more than two
members of the governing body "called by the mayor or any member of the city council at which
members of the city council, less in number than a quorum meet for the purpose of discussing or
taking any action on any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the city council."
Mayor ofEI Dorado v. El Dorado Broad. Co., 544 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Ark. l 976) (quoting ARK.
CooE ANN. § 12-2805 (Michie 1968)).
12. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24-6-402(2)(a) (2001). For local governments in Colorado, the open
meeting requirement applies to meetings ofeither a quorum or three or more members ofthe local
governing body gathered together, whichever is less. Id. Only Alaska and Virginia has a statute
embracing this "lesser of quorum or three or more members" test. ALASKA STA'r. §
44.62.3 IO(h)(20)(A) (Michie 2001); VA. CODE. ANN. § 2.1-341.
13. FLA. STAT.§ 165.22.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
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B.1950
In Turk v. Richard, 17 the Florida Supreme Court, in a declaratory
judgment action seeking interpretation of the Prior Law, held that the Prior
Law only applied to "formal assemblages of the council sitting as a joint
deliberative body as were required or authorized by law to be held for the
transaction of official municipal business . ..." 18 The Florida Supreme
Court reasoned that a gathering of some or all of the members of a city
council only constitutes a meeting of that council under the Prior Law if
action taken at such a gathering could bind the individual members. 19
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court found that without a formal
meeting held in the manner prescribed by law, there was no "meeting"
under Chapter 165.22.20
Admittedly, this holding seems unnecessarily restrictive to the extent it
implies that only formal assemblages held for the transaction of official
business, as distinguished from non-binding discussions, can constitute
meetings ofthe governing body. 21 A lone concurring opinion even went so
far as to say that the holding in Turk permitted establishment of a special
committee of the governing body which could meet in private to discuss
matters that would have to be discussed in public at a meeting of the
governing body as a whole.22 Implicit in the concurring opinion was that the
special committee would not have the power to decide any issue on behalf
ofthe governing body and that the committee meeting would not, therefore,
be a meeting of the governing body.
Regardless of where the remaining Justices stood on that position, the
Florida Supreme Court, as a whole, clearly felt compelled to interpret the
Prior Law in a manner that would only subject to the open meeting law
gatherings for which the board as a governing body could reasonably be
held responsible.
There is nothing in the Sunshine Law, as it reads, that could possibly
lead one to conclude that the Legislature intended to overrule Turk. On the
contrary, looking solely at the language of the Sunshine Law, an opposite
conclusion seems compelled by the fact that under section 286.011(I) ofthe
Sunshine Law the applicable language refers only to "meetings ofany board
or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.

at 544.

21. Turk, 47 So. 2d at 544.

22. Id. (Chapman, J., concurring).
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authority of any county, municipal corporation or political subdivision ...
at which official acts are to be taken ... . •m It is hard not to conclude that
the italicized words ratify, rather than reject, the holding in Turk. 24 Without
clear and substantial evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, under
accepted canons of statutory construction, the plain meaning of the
Sunshine Law requires the conclusion that at the very least, the prohibited
meeting satisfy the statutory requirement that it be a meeting of the
governing body (in our case, the District Board) as distinguished from an
informal gathering of individual officials (in our case District trustees) that
is neither sanctioned by the governing body nor capable oftaking any action
on behalf of the governing body.
The simple fact is that without a quorum or some form of delegated
authority, the governing body should not be held liable for informal
gatherings of one or more of its members.Nor can it be logically expected
to give notice of such an unauthorized gathering that is unknown to the
board.25 Without such a nexus to the governing body, there is no meeting
which could reasonably be characterized as a board meeting. If the
Legislature had intended to broaden the coverage of the Sunshine Law to
include one-on-one consultations and other nonquorum gatherings, the
Legislature could easily have said so, expressly stating that "meeting"
means the gathering of two or more members. In short, the Legislature
could have adopted the per se board meeting rule forbidding the private
congregation of two or more board members whenever board matters are
discussed, if that was its intent.
In the absence of legislative history in support of the per se board
meeting rule, Turk and restraining words of the statute seem to foreclose
such a rule. How then did it arise? As one of the author's law professors
was so fond of saying, "Read on."

23. FLA. STAT.§ 286.01 I (2000) (emphasis added).
24. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the official acts language was added in the
1967 bill after an identical bill without that language had died in committee for six successive
years. Robert E. Greenberg, An Annotated History ofFlorida's "Sunshine law," l 18CONG. REC.,
26908, 26912 n.7 (1972).
25. The notice requirement in the statute was added in 1995. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)
(1995). The courts had already held that the statute necessarily required notice. TSI S.E., Inc. v.
Royals, 588 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Rhea v. City of Gainesville, 574 So. 2d 221,
222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); see also Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
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III. CASE LAW UNDER SUNSHINE LAW
A. The Insinuation ofthe Per Se Board Meeting Rule

1. 1969
The Florida Supreme Court first addressed the Sunshine Law in Board
ofPublic Instruction ofBroward County v. Doran.26 In that case the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Sunshine Law and the final judgment of
the trial court enjoining the governing body of a political subdivision from
violating the Sunshine Law,
including, without limitation, the holdings of meetings or conference
sessions at which a quorum is present, wherein all or part of the
public is excluded, . . . or at which are held any discussions on
current, or forseeably so, matters, not privileged, pertaining to the
duties and responsibilities of the BOARD OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION OF BROWARD COUNTY.27
The facts giving rise to Doran involved two meetings convened by the
governing body at which no formal action was taken. 28 Four members of the
school board, constituting a quorum, were present at the first meeting.29 As
stated by Justice Adkins, it was a "routine meeting held every Wednesday
before the formal action."30 Justice Adkins further recited that during the
meeting "the board discussed a proposed salary schedule...."31 He later
added, "[t]he board then passed a motion to exclude all people except the
press from the conference meeting.,m The second meeting discussed in
Doran involved the entire school board.All the members met to discuss
business of the board.33 This was a meeting where ''the board met in closed
session for a period of two and one-half hours."34 In short, both meetings

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

224 So. 2d 693 (Fla 1969).
Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
Id. at 695-97.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Doran, 224 So. 2d at 696 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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were properly cast as meetings ofthe board, and not an informal gathering
of less than a quorum.35
The fact of the matter is Doran focused on meetings which could only
be characterized as "meetings" of the board. As previously stated, the crux
of the judgment was an injunction that forbade "meetings or conference
sessions at which a quorum is present."36
In Doran, Justice Adkins construed the Court's opinion in Turk as
limiting the open meeting requirement to "formal assemblages for the
transaction of official business. ,m The issue was, therefore, whether the
Court was bound by this formulation of the Turk decision. Justice Adkins
attempted to glean from the Sunshine Law a legislative override of this
interpretation. He stated:
Under the decision in Turk v. Richard, supra, it would have been
unnecessary to include a provision declaring certain meetings as
"public meetings" if the intent of the Legislature had been to include
only formal assemblages for the transaction ofofficial business. The
obvious intent was to cover any gathering of the members where the
members deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be
taken by the board.38
The first sentence makes little sense. The statement in the Sunshine Law
that all meetings ofthe governing body are declared to be public meetings
merely provides the reason for requiring that they be open to the public.39
As for the second sentence, without more it is simply an unsubstantiated
categorical assertion. Of course, Justice Adkins could offer no evidence in
the nature of legislative staff reports, committee hearings, debates before
the Legislature or otherwise that supported what he concluded was the
"obvious intent" of the Legislature when it adopted the Sunshine Law.40
In light of the existence of the Prior Law and Turk, the only logical
explanation for the Sunshine Law, given the Legislature's failure to indicate
a contrary intent, is that the Legislature did not intend to override Turk, but
rather intended to ( 1) expand the reach of the prior law to cover all state
agencies and local governmental units instead of just cities and towns, and
(2) put more teeth in the law by invalidating actions taken at such private
35. Id
36. Doran, 224 So. 2d at 697 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 698.
38. Id.
39. FLA. STAT.§ 286.011(1).
40. Id.
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meetings and allowing for injunctive relief to carry out the purposes ofthe
Sunshine Law. This is exactly the position the Second District Court of
Appeal took in Times Publishing Co. v. Wil/iams41 six weeks before the
Florida Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Doran case.
In Times Publishing Co., the District Court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of a complaint that sought to enjoin secret meetings of a school
board. 42 The District Court stated:
The legislature is presumed to have been aware of the ruling case
law as it relates to the subject matter of [the Sunshine Law], and to
have drawn it with those cases in mind. It is obvious that the
legislature intended to extend application of the "open meeting"
concept so as to bind every "board or commission" of the state, or
ofany county or political subdivision over which it has dominion and
control. In so doing, it expressly provided that the act related to "All
meetings [of the governing bodies involved]*** at which official
acts are to be taken***," and as one ofthe remedies for a violation
thereofit effectively voided any "formal action" taken by such bodies
at closed meetings. There is nothing in the language ofthe actfrom
which it can be said that the legislature intended to avoid or limit
the holding in Turk. As far as it goes, the Turk case is helpful as it
relates to the nature of the meetings covered by such an act, and
insofar as it defines "meetings."43
The District Court did not, however, interpret Turk as requiring that the
"meeting" be a formal assemblage held to take formal action, as asserted in
Doran. The District Court took a different track, stating:
[The Turk] case really only stands for the proposition therefore, that
a "meeting," within the purview ofthe act, is ajoint assemblage at
which "formal action" could be taken, though not necessarily
certain to be taken.44
In short, the District Court read Turk (correctly, it is submitted) as
requiring that the assemblage be a gathering of members who at least have
the authority to take formal action on behalf of the governing body. 45 The
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).

Id. at 477.
Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 472-73.
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District Court then held that the Sunshine Law requirement, that the
meeting be one at which official acts are to be taken, is satisfied so long as
the meeting includes "any discussion, deliberation, decision, or formal
action ... relating
to, or within the scope of, the official duties or affairs of
,,
such body. ..6
In reaching its decision, the District Court reasoned that "formal action"
was merely a subset, or the last step, of the official acts that could be taken
at a board meeting, and that it would make no sense to limit official acts to
formal action which the public can in any event easily ascertain.47 Hence,
any board meeting discussions that may lead to formal action constitute
"official acts" under the Sunshine Law as interpreted by the District Court.48
Over the next thirty years, the State Attorney General, in a string of
advisory opinions, miscited the District Court's discussion of official acts
as authority for the per se board meeting rule. 49 In every instance, the
opinions conveniently ignored the holding of the Second District Court of
Appeal that the Turk court's definition of "meeting" applied and that, to
46. Times Pub/ 'g Co., 222 So. 2d. at474.
47 . /dat473-74.
48. The relevant language from the District Court opinion reads as follows: "[T]he question
still remains as to just what is meant by the terms 'official acts' and 'formal action' which were
added [to the Sunshine Law]; and the Turk case cannot help us there because these phrases were
not in the act before that court." Id. at473.
The District Court further reasoned that
[e ]very thought, as well as every affirmative act, of a public official as it relates
to and is within the scope of his official duties, is a matter of public concern; and
it is the entire decision-making process that the legislature intended to affect by
the enactment of the statute before us.
Id.

In conclusion, the District Court stated,
[w]e think then that the legislature was obviously talking about two different
things by the use of these phrases, and we can't agree with appellee that "official
acts" are limited to "formal action," or that they are synonymous.Clearly the
legislature must have intended to include more than the mere affirmative formal
act of voting on an issue or the formal execution of an official document. ...
Thus, in the light of the language in Turk, supra, and of the obvious purpose of
the statute, the legislature could only have meant to include therein the acts of
deliberation, discussion and deciding occurring prior and leading up to the
affirmative "formal action" which renders official the final decisions of the
governing bodies.

Id. at 473-74.

49. See infra text accompanying notes 82, 150, and 202.
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come under the Sunshine Law, the meetings therefore had to occur at a
joint assemblage at which formal action could be taken on behalf of the
governing body.
In Doran, the majority of the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
Turk permitted informal secret meetings so long as no formal action was
taken on behalf of the governing body. 50 Justice Adkins, writing for the
Florida Supreme Court, had to either ignore the well established rule of
construction that the Legislature drafted the Sunshine Law with Turk in
mind, or concoct a legislative override. He would have been better off if he
had adopted the reasoning of the Second District Court ofAppeal in Times
Publishing Co.
In Doran, the Florida Supreme Court left the question of whether the
Sunshine Law applied to meetings of less than a quorum to another day.
However, some may argue that Justice Adkins set the stage for the per se
board meeting rule in his rebuttal of the contention that the Sunshine Law
applied only to meetings at which an official act occurred. Justice Adkins
wrote, "defendant contends that factually no 'official act' occurred within
the meaning of the law and injunctive relief was improperly granted
plaintiff."51
Adkins then launched a broadside attack on secret meetings in general.
His opinion stated:
The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all
phases of enactments by boards and commissions is a source of
strength in our country. During past years tendencies toward secrecy
in public affairs have been the subject ofextensive criticism. Terms
such as managed news, secret meetings, closed records, executive
sessions, and study sessions have become synonymous with 'hanky
panky' in the minds of public-spirited citizens. One purpose of the
Sunshine Law was to maintain the faith ofthe public in governmental
agencies. Regardless oftheir good intentions, these specified boards
and commissions, through devious ways, should not be allowed to
deprive the public of this inalienable right to be present and to be
heard at all deliberations wherein decisions affecting the public are
being made.

50. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward County v. Doran,224 So. 2d 693,698 (Fla. 1969).
51. Id. at 699.
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Statutes enacted for the public benefit should be interpreted most
favorably to the public.52
The Adkins rhetoric about inalienable rights to be present was classic
emotive reasoning with no foundation in fact. 53 It is universally accepted
that under the common law no such right existed.54 Yet, even taking Justice
Adkins' comments at face value, when all the dust settled, it was actions "of
the board and commission" against which he railed, leaving one to
reasonably conclude that gatherings of less than a quorum of the board
members unsanctioned by the board were not within the ambit of his
scom.55
2. 1970
In Jones v. Tanzler, 56 the First District Court of Appeal did not
overreact to the Adkins rhetoric. 57 In this case the trial court ordered
dismissal of an amended complaint that a Sunshine Law violation had
occurred when council business was discussed at an informal private
meeting ofless than a quorum ofthe members ofthe City Council.58 The
trial court found that such a meeting was not contrary to the Sunshine
Law. 59 On appeal, the District Court affirmed the trial court's order in a per
curiam opinion.60 The District Court stated that:
[w]e have compared the alleged facts in this case with the alleged
facts contained in [Doran] ... and we do not find that the order of
the trial court dismissing the last amended complaint without leave
to further amend is in conflict with said Doran.61
This statement was a clear cut holding that a meeting under the Sunshine
Law requires a quorum ofthe members ofthe board or commission. Justice

52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Justice Adkins in a later case acknowledged that there was no common law right to
public meetings. See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971).
55. Doran, 224 So. 2d at 699.
56. 234 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
51. Id.
58. Id.
59. Justice Adkins brought out those facts in his concurring opinion. Jones v. Tanzler, 238
So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 1970) (Adkins, J., concurring).
60. Tanzler, 234 So. 2d at 372.
61. Id.

UNIVERS11Y OF FWRIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBUC POUCY

224

[Vol. 13

Adkins' vigorous concurrence when the case came before the Florida
Supreme Court underscored this point.62
In Jones v. Tanzler, the Florida Supreme Court, by petition for
certiorari, was asked to review the decision of the District Court on the
grounds that it was in direct conflict on the same point of law with the
decision in Doran.63 Such a conflict was needed in order for the Florida
Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of the case.64 In a per curiam opinion,
the Florida Supreme Court discharged the appeal.65 At this point it would
appear that the Florida Supreme Court had concluded that the holding of
the Appeals court was not in conflict with the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Doran. Two concurring opinions, however, show a lack of
unanimity on the issue.
Justice Adkins concurred specially in the opinion in which the Chief
Justice also concurred. 66 In his special concurring opinion, Justice Adkins
stated that, but for the bond validation proceedings, he would have quashed
the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal on the grounds that the
complaint showed a violation of the Sunshine Law.67 He stated that he
concurred in the discharge of the writ of certiorari for the sole reason that
the questions raised in the alleged Sunshine Law violation "are properly
presented in the pending validation proceedings...."68
All in all, four justices in effect concluded that the District Court's
opinion did not conflict with Doran, Justice Adkins and the Chief Justice
concluded there was a conflict, and Justice Roberts finessed the issue
without joining either side of the issue.69
Justice Adkins spelled out his concerns as follows:
Defendants contend that no official action as contemplated by the
law could be taken until a quorum of the Council acted and an
informal gathering of a small group of the Council wherein no
official action could be taken does not come within the meaning of
a gathering of members of a board or commission. The statute does
not make reference to the existence ofa quorum.All meetings ofany
agency or authority of a municipal corporation are declared to be
public meetings open to the public at all times. The important
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Tanzler, 238 So. 2d at 92 (Adkins, I., concurring).

Id

FLA. CONST.

art. V, § 3(b)(3).

Tanzler, 238 So. 2d at 91.

Id. at 94 (Adkins, I., concurring).
61. Id.
68. Id. (Adkins, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 92.
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question is not whether a quorum was present, but whether the
members deal with any matter on which foreseeable action may be
taken.
There is no law which prevents members of a board [or]
commission from attending a social gathering at the same time, but
the statute should not be circumvented by this Court in placing the
stamp of approval on small individual gatherings wherein public
officials, regardless of good intentions, may reach decisions in
private on matters which may foreseeably affect the public. It is
elementary that the officials cannot do indirectly what they are
prevented from doing directly.

***
The right of the public to be present and to be heard should not
be circumvented by having secret meetings of various committees
composed of members ofthe Council and vested with [the] authority
to make recommendations to the Council.

***
[A]ny Council could divide itself into groups of small committees
and each councilman would have the opportunity to commit himself
on some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by
expressing himself at a secret committee meeting ... The ultimate
action of the entire Council in a public meeting would merely be an
affirmation of various secret committee meetings.... 70
Justice Adkins was in effect saying that the risk of secret meetings can
only be thwarted by making the Sunshine Law apply to any group of board
members acting as a committee of the board, regardless of the language of
the statute.71
The fact remained that a majority of the Florida Supreme Court, by
discharging the writ of certiorari in Jones, concluded that the holding in
Tanzler was not in conflict with Doran. Hence, the Florida Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to take the appeal. As previously noted, Tanzler
required a quorum for application of the Sunshine Law.

10. Tanz/er, 238 So. 2d at 92-93 (Adkins, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

11. Id. at 91.
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In City ofMiami Beach v. Berns,72 the Third District Court of Appeal
interpreted Doran to mean that the Sunshine Law "[applies] not only to
formal quorum meetings thereof but also to informal preliminary meetings
of all or part of the members of such boards dealing with matters as to
which it was foreseeable that action would be taken by the board."73 A first
year law student would fail a test if the student said that Doran contained
such a holding.74 It clearly did not.
3. 1971
The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Adkins,
affirmed the Third District Court of Appeal's holding in City of Miami
Beach v. Berns15 that the Sunshine Law superseded and repealed the Prior
Law and applied to all meetings of the city council, including informal
executive sessions of the council "at which the public is excluded for the
discussion of condemnation matters, personnel matters, pending litigation
or any other matter relating to city government."76 These sessions were
clearly meetings of the governing body as a whole. In his opinion, however,
Justice Adkins could not resist launching into a discussion of the Sunshine
Law that far exceeded the scope of the question presented by writ of
certiorari to the Court. He wrote:
A secret meeting occurs when public officials meet at a time and
place to avoid being seen or heard by the public. When at such
meetings officials mentioned in Fla. Stat. § 286.011, F.S.A., transact
or agree to transact public business at a future time in a certain
manner they violate the government in the sunshine law, regardless
of whether the meeting is formal or informal.

***
It is the law's intent that any meeting, relating to any matter on
which foreseeable action will be taken occur openly and publicly. In
this area of regulating, the statute maypush beyond debatable limits
in order to block evasive techniques. An informal conference or

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

231 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 38 and subsequent discussion herein of Doran.
245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
Id. at 39.

I
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caucus ofany two or more members permits crystallization of secret
decisions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance. 77
It is not the statute, but Justice Adkins in the above quoted dicta pushed
the Sunshine Law beyond debatable limits. A superficial reading of Berns
would seem to suggest that the Court (albeit in dicta) embraced a per se
board meeting rule. 78 However, a more careful reading of the case leads to
a contrary conclusion. In the penultimate paragraph of the opinion, Justice
Adkins made an extraordinary admission that reflected a significant division
in the Florida Supreme Court by stating that the majority of the Court is of
the opinion that this case should be decided solely upon the question
presented by the petitioner and that future problems will have to be met as
they arise. 79
That question, certified to the Florida Supreme Court, simply posed
whether the Sunshine Law repealed the prior law and whether meetings
under the Sunshine Law included informal executive sessions of the city
council.
Notwithstanding that (1) the Second District Court of Appeal held in
Times Publishing Co., that it was bound by the Turk definition of
"meetings," (2) the First District Court of Appeal in Tanzler held that a
quorum was required for application of the Sunshine Law, (3) the majority
of the Florida Supreme Court necessarily concluded that Tanzler was not
in conflict with Doran, which focused on "meetings or conference sessions
at which a quorum is present,"80 and (4) the majority of the Florida
Supreme Court in Berns took the extraordinary action of requiring that
Justice Adkins expressly limit his opinion to the question certified to the
Court, namely, in relevant part, whether the Sunshine Law applied to
"informal executive sessions of the city council," in Attorney General
Opinion 071-32, March 3, 1971, the State Attorney General chartered a
different course. The Attorney General instead opined that the Sunshine
Law applied to a telephone conversation between two members of a board
or commission relating to or bearing upon the public's business and then
cited as the sole authority for his opinion the Doran and Times Publishing
Co. cases. 81 Language taken from these two cases elucidated what
constituted "official acts" under the Sunshine Law and was mistakenly
quoted as authority for what amounted to a board "meeting" under that
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added),
See supra text accompanying note 36.
81. See id
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law. 82 Thus, the State Attorney General, for the first time, applied but did
not fully articulate, the per se board meeting rule.
Although the Attorney General opinion was only advisory, and not
binding on the courts,83 it helped lay the foundation for the myth that the
courts had adopted the per se board meeting rule, when in fact the only
court which clearly addressed the issue in a non quorum context was the
First District Court ofAppeal in Tanzler, which clearly held to the contrary.
As for the Doran and Times Publishing Co., for the reasons herein stated,
reliance on those cases was at best misplaced.
In a newspaper interview, the Sunshine Law's Senate author, J. Emory
Cross, considered to be the father of the Law, characterized the Attorney
General's telephone opinion as ''way out" absurd.84 The newspaper article
further reported that Cross thought the requirement of a quorum ''was
clearly put, indicating he did not intend to prevent a couple of public
officials meeting for dinner or talking on the phone for fear of violating the
law."85 Even thoughtful members of the press questioned the reach of the
telephone opinion. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist H.G. "Buddy" Davis,
who wrote articles exposing the evils of closed door meetings, was quoted
as saying, "When a responsible guy goes around and says two officials have
to invite reporters to listen to a phone conversation - that's ridiculous."86
Later in the year, members of the Florida Society of Newspapers were
more explicit and on the mark, stating "[o]ur concern is with closed
82. 32 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 51-52 (1971). The Attorney General's non sequitur followed:
"Thus, telephone conversations between public officials on aspects of the public's business arc
part of the process which ultimately leads up to final recorded action in a fonnal public meeting,
and they may not be held covertly." Id. at 52.
The Attorney General failed to either appreciate or acknowledge that the language upon
which he relied addressed what constituted official acts, rather than what amounted to a board
meeting, under the Sunshine Law and that the two cases from which the language was taken can
only be read as holding that such a meeting must be "a joint assemblage at which 'fonnal action'
could be taken" (Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see supra
text accompanying note 44) or "any gathering of the members where the members deal with some
matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the board" (Doran, see supra text
accompanying note 38). A per se board meeting rule simply cannot be inferred.
83. Leadership Hous., Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 336 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
(overruling an attorney general opinion). As stated in the web site for State Attorney General
Opinions under the caption General Nature and Purpose of Opinions, "[the attorney general
opinions] are advisory only and not binding in a court of law," available at http://legal.flffl.
edu/opinions/faq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
84. Greenberg, supra note 24.
85. When research assistant, Robert E. Greenberg, later interviewed Cross on July 7, 1972,
the senator repeated his characterization of the State Attorney General's "absurd ruling that the
law applied when two or more public officials congregate." Id at 26912.
86. Id at 26913 (citing in note 111 MELBOURNE TIMES, Mar. 19, 1971, at 3 ).
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meetings or hideaway meetings by a quorum or committee with authority
to act."87
In Attorney General Opinion 071-295, September 24, 1971, the
Attorney General resumed his misplaced reliance on case law. This time he
seiz.ed upon the disavowed Justice Adkins dicta in Berns and twisted that
language into a Court holding. In response to the question as to whether
members of the governing body could go on a boat trip or have lunch
together prior to a formal meeting on the same day without opening the
event to the public, the Attorney General said:
[A] purely social meeting at which no official business is to be
discussed or transacted might not violate the letter of the Sunshine
Law. However, when such a meeting is held in a place where the
public and the press are effectively excluded from participation, it is
a "secret meeting" as defined by the court in the Berns case, supra;
and the court might very well conclude that such a meeting is an
"evasive technique" to avoid the statute, just as it held that a
discussion of official business by less than a quorum ''permits
crystallization of secret discussions to a point just short of
ceremonial acceptance" and should be avoided. 88
The Attorney General's statement of the holding in Berns addressing
situations when less than a quorum is involved, is simply untrue. As
previously stated, the question certified to the Court involved a quorum,
and the majority of the Court clearly disowned the Adkins dicta that
underpinned the Attorney General's opinion. The Court deferred deciding
whether even a committee ofless than a quorum ofthe board, much less an
unsanctioned meeting ofless than a quorum ofthe board, was subject to the
Sunshine Law. That judicial restraint did not deter the Attorney General in
AGO 071-346, October 21, 1971, from opining, without citation of
authority, that committees of less of a quorum of the board were required
under the Sunshine Law to give reasonable notice of their meetings. 89
4. 1972
In 1972, the State Attorney General embraced the per se board meeting
rule with a vengeance. Without citation ofany case law authority, he opined
in AGO 072-16, January 12, 1972, that two or more legislators, regardless
87. Id. at 26911 (citing in note 121 GAINESVILLE SUN, May 7, 1971, at 7).
88. 295 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1971) (emphasis added).
89. 346 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1971).
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law. 82 Thus, the State Attorney General, for the first time, applied but did
not fully articulate, the per se board meeting rule.
Although the Attorney General opinion was only advisory, and not
binding on the courts,83 it helped lay the foundation for the myth that the
courts had adopted the per se board meeting rule, when in fact the only
court which clearly addressed the issue in a non quorum context was the
First District Court ofAppeal in Tanzler, which clearly held to the contrary.
As for the Doran and Times Publishing Co., for the reasons herein stated,
reliance on those cases was at best misplaced.
In a newspaper interview, the Sunshine Law's Senate author, J. Emory
Cross, considered to be the father of the Law, characterized the Attorney
General's telephone opinion as ''way out" absurd.84 The newspaper article
further reported that Cross thought the requirement of a quorum ''was
clearly put, indicating he did not intend to prevent a couple of public
officials meeting for dinner or talking on the phone for fear of violating the
law."85 Even thoughtful members of the press questioned the reach of the
telephone opinion. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist H.G. "Buddy" Davis,
who wrote articles exposing the evils of closed door meetings, was quoted
as saying, "When a responsible guy goes around and says two officials have
to invite reporters to listen to a phone conversation-that's ridiculous."86
Later in the year, members of the Florida Society of Newspapers were
more explicit and on the mark, stating "[o]ur concern is with closed
82. 32 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 51-52 (1971). The Attorney General's non sequitur followed:
"Thus, telephone conversations between public officials on aspects of the public's business are
part of the process which ultimately leads up to final recorded action in a fonnal public meeting,
and they may not be held covertly." Id. at 52.
The Attorney General failed to either appreciate or acknowledge that the language upon
which he relied addressed what constituted official acts, rather than what amounted to a board
meeting, under theSunshine Law and that the two cases from which the language was taken can
only be read as holding that such a meeting must be "a joint assemblage at which 'fonnal action'
could be taken" (Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see supra
text accompanying note 44) or "any gathering ofthe members where the members deal with some
matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the board" (Doran, see supra text
accompanying note 38). A per se board meeting rule simply cannot be inferred.
83. Leadership Rous., Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 336So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 4thDCA 1976)
(overruling an attorney general opinion). As stated in the web site for State Attorney General
Opinions under the caption General Nature and Purpose of Opinions, "(the attorney general
opinions] are advisory only and not binding in a court of law," available at http://legal.fun.
edu/opinions/faq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
84. Greenberg, supra note 24.
85. When research assistant, Robert E. Greenberg, later interviewed Cross on July 7, 1972,
the senator repeated his characterimtion of the State Attorney General's "absurd ruling that the
law applied when two or more public officials congregate." Id. at 26912.
86. Id. at 26913 (citing in note 111 MELBOURNE TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1971, at 3).
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meetings or hideaway meetings by a quorum or committee with authority
to act."87
In Attorney General Opinion 071-295, September 24, 1971, the
Attorney General resumed his misplaced reliance on case law. This time he
seized upon the disavowed Justice Adkins dicta in Berns and twisted that
language into a Court holding. In response to the question as to whether
members of the governing body could go on a boat trip or have lunch
together prior to a formal meeting on the same day without opening the
event to the public, the Attorney General said:
[A] purely social meeting at which no official business is to be
discussed or transacted might not violate the letter of the Sunshine
Law. However, when such a meeting is held in a place where the
public and the press are effectively excluded from participation, it is
a "secret meeting" as defined by the court in the Berns case, supra;
and the court might very well conclude that such a meeting is an
"evasive technique" to avoid the statute, just as it held that a
discussion of official business by less than a quorum "permits
crystallization of secret discussions to a point just short of
ceremonial acceptance" and should be avoided 88
The Attorney General's statement of the holding in Berns addressing
situations when less than a quorum is involved, is simply untrue. As
previously stated, the question certified to the Court involved a quorum,
and the majority of the Court clearly disowned the Adkins dicta that
underpinned the Attorney General's opinion. The Court deferred deciding
whether even a committee ofless than a quorum ofthe board, much less an
unsanctioned meeting ofless than a quorum ofthe board, was subject to the
Sunshine Law. That judicial restraint did not deter the Attorney General in
AGO 071-346, October 21, 1971, from opining, without citation of
authority, that committees of less of a quorum of the board were required
under the Sunshine Law to give reasonable notice of their meetings. 89
4. 1972
In 1972, the State Attorney General embraced the per se board meeting
rule with a vengeance. Without citation ofany case law authority, he opined
in AGO 072-16, January 12, 1972, that two or more legislators, regardless
87. Id. at 26911 (citing in note 121 GAINESVILLE SUN, May 7, 1971, at 7).
88. 295 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1971) (emphasis added).
89. 346 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1971).
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of whether they constituted a numerical minority of a committee, were
subject to the Sunshine Law. Later that year, in AGO 072-158, May 11,
1972, he cited as his sole authority, Berns, for the blatantly false assertion
that "by judicial interpretation the law includes all meetings of two or more
members of the public board of Commissioners at which official acts are to
be discussed and deliberated. •>90 The per se board meeting rule finally found
its voice in an Attorney General opinion which stated that county
commissioners at a private booster club luncheon could listen about a
matter that would come before the board, without regard to the Sunshine
Law, so long as they did not discuss the matter until the board met. As far
as the State Attorney General was concerned, out of context dicta, taken
from Justice Adkins' opinion in Berns and disowned by a majority of the
Florida Supreme Court, was the law of the land.
In Bassett v. Braddock,91 the Florida Supreme Court restrained the reach
of the Sunshine Law.92 The Florida Supreme Court held that labor
negotiators, employed by a school board in a preliminary or tentative
teacher contract negotiation with teachers' representatives, could negotiate
outside of public meetings without violating the Sunshine Law. In addition,
the board could instruct and consult with its labor negotiators in private
without violating the law.93 The Florida Supreme Court relied in part on a
constitutional provision which guaranteed collective bargaining for
employees. However, in apparent recognition that this provision dealt with
employee rights, rather than employer rights, the Florida Supreme Court
rejected the contention that its prior decisions compelled public meetings
for not only formal acts, but also acts of deliberation, discussion, and
deciding, occurring prior to, and leading up to, affirmative formal action.
As stated by the Florida Supreme Court:
While conceding that our opinions have been as broad as possible
to let in the sunshine under the Legislature's enactment, nevertheless
a careful rereading of our opinions and the Act fail to support the
foregoing contention. It was not specifically involved in our prior
decisions which have dealt principally with "meetings" (some
informal) of a board. We have in earlier opinions referred to
"matters on which foreseeable action will be taken by the Board" and
"any discussions on matters pertaining to the duties and
responsibilities of the Board of Public Instruction of Broward
90.
91.
92.
93.

158 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 262 (1972).
262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 427-28.
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County." These are broad considerations but they still do not
invade the areas of deliberation here involved, for it will be noted
that in all of these observations by the Court, they are predicated
upon a "meeting. " Here the required action under the statutes was
taken in a public meeting; changes were made and voting had, all in
public. The discussions and deliberations, however, in an executive
process often take place beyond the veil of actual "meetings" of the
body involved. It is only in those "meetings" that official action is
taken. Preliminary "discussions" may never result in any action
taken. There may be numerous informal exchanges of ideas and
possibilities, either among members or with others (at the coke
machine, in a foyer, etc.) when there is no relationship at all to any
meeting at which any foreseeable action is contemplated. Such things
germinate gradually and often without really knowing whether any
action or meeting will grow out of the exchanges or thinking.94
The Florida Supreme Court continued:
Every action emanates from thoughts and creations of the mind and
exchanges with others. These are perhaps "deliberations" in a sense
but hardly demanded to be brought forward in the spoken word at
a public meeting. To carry matters to such an extreme approaches
the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive
process of government. One must maintain perspective on a broad
provision such as this legislative enactment, in its application to the
actual workings of an active Board fraught with many and varied
problems and demands.95
Notably, Justice Adkins joined by Justice Boyd, strongly dissented.96
The fact that Adkins and Boyd dissented simply underscored that they could
not muster a majority of the court to push the Sunshine Law "beyond
debatable limits." In this dissent, Justice Adkins made it seem like the Court
had already crossed that threshold. He recast the holding in Doran as
applying to "any gathering dealing with some matter on which foreseeable
action would be taken by the Board."97 Similarly, he quoted the disowned
dicta in Berns as if the words had been embraced by the entire court,
beginning the quotation by saying: "We have previously defined a secret
94. Id. ( emphasis added).
95. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
96. Bassett, 262 So. 2d at 429-31 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 429 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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meeting in the following language.. .. "98 Absent a careful reading of Berns,
few would know what "We" meant.
5. 1973
In Canney v. Board ofPrivate Education,99 a divided Florida Supreme
Court held four to three that a school board acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity was part of the legislative branch of government and was thus
subject to the Sunshine Law when the board deliberated as to whether a
student's suspension should be continued.100 The case focused solely on
whether the Florida Constitution and separation of powers doctrine
prohibited the Legislature from making the Sunshine Law applicable to
quasi-judicial functions delegated to a local governing body.101
Justice Adkins wrote the opinion, and in support of the foundational
statement that the Legislature intended the Sunshine Law to apply to quasi
judicial deliberations, he said: ''The obvious intent of the Government in the
Sunshine Law ... was to cover any gathering of some ofthe members of
a public board where those members discuss some matters on which
foreseeable official action will be taken by the board." 102 In Doran, Justice
Adkins had stated the same proposition but referred only to "any gathering
of the members where the members deal with some matters on which
foreseeable action will be taken by the board." 103 As in the earlier cases,
Adkins' rewrite of the holding in Doran had nothing to do with the case at
bar, which involved a meeting of the board as a whole. Indeed, the
rewording was not even germane to the point he was making, namely the
Legislature intended that the Sunshine Law cover all meetings of the board,
whether or not they involved quasi-judicial deliberations. And, of course,
there was no discussion as to what "some" meant.Yet, as will be shown,
this superfluous dicta became, in the eyes of the Third District Court of
Appeal and the State Attorney General, additional authority for the per se
board meeting rule.

98. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
99. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
100. Id. at 263-64.
101. Id at 262.
102. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
103. See supra text accompanying note 38 (emphasis added). Significantly, when the Florida
Supreme Court had occasion recently to restate this seminal proposition, it reverted to the
language originally taken from Doran. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. v. Magaha, 769 So. 2d 1012, 1021
(Fla. 2000).
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A month after Canney was decided, the Third District Court of Appeal
in Hough v. Stembridge,1 04 held that Florida's Sunshine Law not only
applied to a gathering of less than a quorum of a governing body, but also
to members elect who constituted two ofthe three officials who met. 105 The
court stated:
In order for there to be a violation of F.S. § 286.01 I, F.S.A., a
meeting between two or more public officials qiust take place which
is violative of the statute's spirit, intent, and purpose. The obvious
intent of the Government in the Sunshine Law, supra, was to cover
any gathering of some ofthe members of a public board where those
members discuss some matters on which foreseeable action may be
taken by the board. 106
As for the argument that there could not be any assemblage of a board
since there was, in law, only one board member at the meeting, the District
Court responded:
We simply cannot accept this line of reasoning. To adopt this
viewpoint would in effect permit as in the case sub judice members
elect of a public board or commission to gather with impunity behind
closed doors and discuss matters on which foreseeable action may be
taken by that board or commission in clear violation of the purpose,
intent, and spirit of the Government in the Sunshine Law .
. . . An individual upon immediate election to public office loses his
status as a private individual and acquires the position more akin to
that of a public trustee. 107
As a result, Justice Adkins' rewrite of the Doran holding, taken
verbatim from the throw away dicta in Canney, came home to roost. That
dicta, together with an invocation of the unsubstantiated "purpose, intent
and spirit" of the Sunshine Law, became the sole authority for the first and
only judicial holding for the per se board meeting rule. The District Court
did not even try to explain how the gathering in question could possibly be
a board meeting. Not surprisingly, the District Court did not certify to the
Florida Supreme Court that this landmark holding was a question of great
104. 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
105. Id. at 289.
106. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224
So. 2d 693,698 (Fla. 1969) and Canney v. Bd. of Private Educ., 278 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1973)).
107. Id.
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public interest. Given the predilections of the majority of the Court, one can
only surmise that the District Court feared its holding would be summarily
reversed.
B. Tangents that Make a Point
In a few subsequent court opinions, some loose dicta gives surface
credence to the per se board meeting rule. However, a more careful reading
of the cases reveals an embrace not of the per se board meeting rule, but of
either ( 1) a delegation of authority rationale in which a smaller or different
group of board members or delegees designated by the board are deemed
to be acting on behalf of the board, or (2) a negative per se board meeting
rule, which makes the obvious point that one cannot even get to the
question of whether there has been a board meeting unless at least two
board members meet. The author has no quarrel with either proposition. In
subsequent State Attorney General opinions, however, we find the per se
board meeting rule as a starting point for further amplification of tortured
distinctions.
In IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town ofPalm Beach,108 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that an ad hoc planning committee appointed by the
Town Board to provide advice to a consultant on preparing a
comprehensive zoning plan was subject to the Sunshine Law. 109 Although
the District Court quoted with approval some of Justice Adkins' dicta in
Berns that the State Attorney General cites in support of the per se board
meeting rule, the Court's holding rested exclusively on the conclusion that
the planning committee acted as an alter ego of the town board.110 As stated
by the District Court, "The Sunshine Law does not provide for any
'government by delegation' exception; a public body cannot escape the
application of the Sunshine Law by undertaking to delegate the conduct of
public business through an alter ego."111
1. 1974
In Attorney General Opinion 074-47, February 10, 1974, the State
Attorney General concluded that individual city council members could
consult in private with the city manager on city business as long as no effort
was made to "intentionally avoid the requirements of an open meeting by
having an individual who is not a board member act as a liaison for board
108.
109.
110.
111.

279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id.
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members by circulating information and thoughts of individual councilmen
to the rest of the board."112 The opinion, however, points to a tensioned
dichotomy that permitted private one-on-one consultation between the city
manager and a board member but prohibited, under the per se board
meeting rule, such consultation between board members, thus giving to
non-elected "professionals" a whip hand over elected board members that
even Justice Adkins would begin to rue in a later opinion.113
For the Attorney General, the delegation of authority rationale provided
grounds for expanding the reach of the Sunshine Law that were separate
from the per se board meeting rule. In Attorney General Opinion 074-84,
March 25, 1974, he asserted the per se board meeting rule as a given,
without regard to whether the two or more members had authority to act
on behalf of the board (the Florida Board of Dentistry), citing both Doran
and Berns as authority for the rule.114 Then, under the delegation of
authority rationale set forth in IDS Properties, Inc., he opined that the
Sunshine Law applied to a hearing conducted by a single board member,
delegated the authority to do so, on the grounds that the board member is
necessarily acting on behalf of the board.115 No attempt was made to explain
why a similar delegation of authority linkage to the board would not also be
required when two or more, but less than a quorum, of the board members
meet.
In Bigelow v. Howze, 116 the Second District Court of Appeal saw the
need for such linkage. At first blush, the District Court seemed to embrace
the reasoning of Justice Adkins and the Hough holding when it held that any
meeting of a fact-finding committee composed of two out of five county
commissioners is subject to the Sunshine Law.117 The District Court first
quoted liberally from Justice Adkins' dissent in Jones relating to a council
dividing itself into small committees to circumvent the Sunshine Law, and
then stated:
While there has not been a specific holding on this point, the
philosophy of the cases which have construed the Sunshine Law
clearly indicates that the decision making process of a duly
appointed committee of a public body composed of more than one

112. 47 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1974).
113. Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 3S1 So. 2d 336, 343-44 (Fla. 1977) (Adkins, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id.
11S. IDS Props., Inc., 279 So. 2d at 3S9.
116. 291 So. 2d 64S (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
117. Id. at 647.
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member of that body must be held in public, even though such
members constitute less than a quorum of the public body.
We do not suggest that the committee cannot interview others
privately concerning the subject matter of the committee's business
or discuss among itself in private those matters necessary to carry
out the investigative [aspects] of the committee's responsibility....
However, at the point where the members of the committee who are
also members of the public body make decisions with respect to the
committee's recommendation, this discussion must be conducted at
a meeting at which the public has been given notice and a reasonable
opportunity to attend.
This court may take judicial notice of the fact that committee
recommendations are often accepted by public bodies at face value
and with little discussion. Therefore, unless the decision making
process of a committee composed of two or more members of the
public body appointing the committee is made in public, the salutory
objectives ofthe Sunshine Law will have indeed become clouded. 118
In Bigelow, as in IDS Properties, Inc., the County Board as a whole
authorized the meetings. The two elected officials were a duly appointed
committee, acting on behalf of the governing body, so as to make these
gatherings meetings of the governing body. Clearly, the Second District
Court of Appeal was not prepared to hold, as the State Attorney General
erroneously claimed had been held by the Florida Supreme Court, that
consultation about pending board business between two or more but less
than a quorum of the members of a board, was ipso facto subject to the
Sunshine Law. 119 Absent board authorization, such consultation lacked the
board's approval which is so obviously critical in the District Court's
reasoning.
In Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 120 Justice Adkins was able to
command a majority in affirming the Fourth District Court of Appeal's
holding in IDS Properties, Inc. that a citizens' planning committee was
subject to the Sunshine Law. 121 Following the Fourth District Court of
Appeal's reasoning, the Florida Supreme Court's holding was predicated
on the proposition that the meeting of the citizens' committee was
sanctioned by the town board and thus took place on behalf of the board.
Justice Adkins reasoned:

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (emphasis added); see City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971).
Bigelow, 291 So. 2d at 647-48.
296 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1974).
Id. at 478.
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One purpose of the government in the [S]unshine [L]aw was to
prevent at nonpublic meetings the crystallization of secret decisions
to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance. Rarely could there be
any purpose to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except to
conduct some part of the decisional process behind closed doors.
The statute should be construed so as to frustrate all evasive devices.
This can be accomplished only by embracing the collective inquiry
and discussion stages within the terms of the statute, as long as such
inquiry and discussion is conducted by any committee or other
authority appointed and established by a governmental agency, and
relates to any matter on which foreseeable action will be taken. 122
Again Justice Adkins hedges the logic of his rhetoric about discussions at
secret meetings by requiring that under the delegation ofauthority rationale,
the committee or authority conducting such discussions be sanctioned by
the governmental agency. 123
One is left to wonder if, notwithstanding his disowned dicta in Berns,
even Justice Adkins would have conceded that a quorum is required under
the statute unless the meeting is of a committee or other gathering
authorized by the governing body as a whole to act on its behalf.
2. 1975
InAttorney General Opinion 075-59, March 6, 1975, the State Attorney
General for the first time cited both Canney and Hough as authority for the
per se board meeting rule. 124 In the opinion, he struggled with the dilemma
of empowering the director of a utilities authority and the city manager to
consult in private with individual members of their respective governing
bodies, while denying such right to any governing body member to consult
with another member. 125 The Attorney General was asked whether the
director and city manager could each inquire in private with each of their
respective board members as to his or her position on a pending board
matter. While acknowledging that such a practice was not per se a violation
of the Sunshine Law, as long as the director or manager did not act as
"liaison," all the Attorney General could do was advise against such
conduct. 126

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
Id. at 478.
59 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1975).
Id.
Id.
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3. 1976
127

In Bennett v. Warden, the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the president of a junior college was neither a board nor a commission
within the meaning of the Sunshine Law, and therefore, meetings between
the president and a group of junior college employees appointed by the
president to discuss working conditions were not subject to the Sunshine
Law. 128 In this case, the District Court distinguished Gradison on the
grounds that the group of junior college employees were, unlike the
planning committee in Gradison, performing only a fact-finding function,
and hence were not delegated any decision making authority by the
president. The District Court said:
. . . [F]requent and unpublicized meetings between an executive
officer and advisors, consultants, staff or personnel under his
direction, for the purpose of "fact-finding" to assist him in the
execution of those duties, are not meetings within the contemplation
of the Sunshine Law. Any other conclusion, carried to its logical
extension, would in our view unduly hamper the efficient operation
ofmodern government the administration of which is more and more
being placed in the hands ofprofessional administrators. It would be
unrealistic, indeed intolerable, to require of such professionals that
every meeting, every contact, and every discussion with anyone from
whom they would seek counsel or consultation to assist in acquiring
the necessary information, data or intelligence needed to advise or
guide the authority by whom they are employed, be a public meeting
within the disciplines of the Sunshine Law. Neither the letter nor the
spirit of the law require it. 129
Inadvertently, perhaps, the Second District Court of Appeal had begun
to articulate one of the reasons why the per se board meeting rule, advanced
in Hough and by the State Attorney General, undercuts effective board
oversight of governmental operations. Just as the professionals need to be
given a free rein to conduct in private a fact-finding expedition in the
performance of their duties, similarly do the members of a governing board
need to be able to consult in private among themselves whenever they think
the information they are being fed in connection with their duties is
incomplete or otherwise suspect. To require that the members compare

127. 333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
128. Id. at 100.
129. Id. at 99-100.
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notes in such a situation only in public, even when done on a one-on-one
basis, is to place the members at the mercy of such professionals as they
advise each member in confidence. Yet this is the kind of absurd result the
per se board meeting rule compels.
In Mitchell v. School Board ofLeon County, 130 the First District Court
of Appeal held that the Sunshine Law did not apply to separate
conversations between the school board attorney and the school board
superintendent and the director of pupil personnel services. 131 The District
Court cited Hough for the proposition that, "Requisite to application to the
Sunshine Law is a meeting between two or more public officials." 132 This
was the first ofa series ofcases (hereinafter discussed) that articulated what
this Article previously described as the negative per se board meeting rule,
namely that, absent any board delegation ofdecision making authority, one
cannot even get to the issue of whether a board meeting has taken place
unless at least two board members meet. However, the First District Court
neither decided nor addressed, under what circumstances a board meeting
in fact takes place where two members meet to discuss board business. The
District Court's holding nevertheless underscored the anomaly of allowing
a single board member to discuss in private a pending business matter with
anyone other than a fellow board member.
4. 1977
In Wolfton v. State, 133 the Second District Court of Appeal held that in
a criminal proceeding, an indictment adequately alleged a violation of the
Sunshine Law. 134 The District Court cited Times Publishing Co. in holding
that the "official acts" component ofa Sunshine Law violation was covered
by an allegation that at the meeting "matters pertaining to City Commission
business, to-wit: Employment of the City Attorney, was [sic] discussed in
willful and knowing violation of Section 286.011, Florida Statutes." 135
Although the-District Court also erroneously cited Times Publishing Co. for
the proposition that the Sunshine Law covers "any gathering of some or all
of the members of a public board,"136 the defendants never challenged the

130. 335 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
131. Id. at 356.
132. Id. at 355.
133. 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
134. Id. at 614.
135. Id. at 613.
136. Id. at 613-14. The District Court also quoted from Adkins' dicta in Gradison that the
Sunshine Law embraced "the collective inquiry and discussion stages within the terms of the
statute, as long as such inquiry and discussion is conducted by any committee or other authority
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indictment on the grounds that no quorum or committee ofcity commission
members was alleged to have been present at the meeting. In short, the
validity of the per se board meeting rule was not an issue in the case.
In Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 137 the Florida Supreme Court held
that an increase in rates set forth in a twenty-two and one half page staff
proposal and approved by the Public Service Commission at a ninety minute
agenda conference was not a violation of the Sunshine Law. 138 In that case
the Florida Supreme Court noted that, "There is, of course, no evidence in
this record that the commissioners met in secret or used staff members as
intermediaries in order to circumvent public meeting requirements. " 139 The
Florida Supreme Court further stated that "the commissioners did not
discuss various points among themselves before making a final decision." 140
But then the Florida Supreme Court added, "The law is satisfied if the
commissioners reached a mutual decision on rate matters when they met
together in public for their 'formal action. "' 141 After stating that "[n]othing
in the Sunshine Law requires each commissioner to do his or her thinking
and studying in public," 142 the Florida Supreme Court observed in a
footnote:
The members of a collegial administrative body are not obliged to
avoid their staff during evaluation and consideration stages of their
deliberations. Were this so, the value of staff expertise would be lost
and the intelligent use of employees would be crippled. This case
does not present a proper occasion, however, for us to determine
whether all private collegial discussions among commissioners
become decision-making acts which must occur in public. See
[Williams], suggesting that all deliberative discussions among
commissioners are within the act, and contrast [Gradison],
condemning pre-meeting agreements which have the effect of
rendering later meetings a "ceremonial sham~" 143

appointed and established by a governmental agency, ..."Id. at 614 (emphasis added). By "some
• • • of the board," the District Court presumably had in mind the italicized limit Adkins placed
on discussions covered by the Sunshine Law. /d.
137. 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977).
138. Id. at 342.
139. Id. at 341.
140. Id. at 342.
141. Id.
142. Mayo, 351 So. 2d at 342.
143. Id. at 342 n.10 (emphasis added).
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Again, the Florida Supreme Court in effect put everyone on notice that it
had not yet decided whether the per se board meeting rule advanced by the
State Attorney General and Hough was in fact the law. Predictably, Justice
Adkins, together with Justice Boyd, dissented.
In his dissent, Justice Adkins argued that the evidence compelled the
inference that the staff was delegated decision making authority, and thus,
commissioner discussions with staff were subject to the Sunshine Law. 144
Rather than acknowledge that an overly broad application of the Sunshine
Law would simply foster staff domination, Adkins sought to correct the
imbalance by probing even deeper into the recesses of the decision making
process under the delegation of authority rationale. In short, if it looks like
the board is accepting staff recommendations with little debate, put all
board members' discussions with staff under the Sunshine Law.
5. 1978
In Florida Parole & Probation Commission v. Thomas, 145 the First
District Court of Appeal held that a decision of the Commissioner's
attorney to appeal an administrative ruling after discussing the matter in
private with the individual Commission members did not violate the
Sunshine Law. 146 The District Court said:
We find nothing improper in the individual discussions had between
members of the Commission and the Commission's legal staff. It is
well settled that frequent, unpublicized meetings between an agency
member and advisors, consultants or staff who assist him in the
discharge of his duties are not meetings within the contemplation of
the Sunshine Law. See [Bennett and Mayo]. 147
Adkins' dissent in Occidental Chemical Co. fell on deaf ears. The Court
relied instead on the negative per se board meeting rule articulated in
Mitchell. 148 And so the unfettered right ofstaffto give in confidence advice
to individual board members, without, under the per se board meeting rule,
an off-setting right of board members to question in private among
themselves the consistency and wisdom of such advice, remained
unchallenged.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 344(Adkins, J., dissenting).
364 So. 2d 480(Fla. 1st DCA 1978)(per curiam).
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 481.
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In 1978, the New York Times Affiliated Newspaper Group of Florida,
not exactly a disinterested party, financed the first Florida Open
Governmental Laws Manual that was, ostensibly, a compilation of legal
precedent and Attorney General Opinions. 149 Not surprisingly, the manual
did not mention any of the following: that Times Publishing Co. held, that
a meeting under the Sunshine Law is a joint assemblage at which formal
action could be taken; that the injunction challenged in Doran focused on
meetings at which there was a quorum; that the majority of the Florida
Supreme Court disowned the Adkins' dicta in Berns; that the First District
Court in Tanzler sustained a trial judge's requirement of a quorum and
construed the holding in Doran as consistent with such a ruling; that a
majority of the Florida Supreme Court in Jones in effect concurred in the
First District Court's construction of Doran; that the dicta about meetings
of "some members" in Canney was not even remotely related to the case at
bar; that the sole authority cited for the per se board meeting rule in Hough
were the non-germane Doran and Canney cases; and that even Justice
Adkins at least intimated in a number of cases that the line drawn for
meetings of less than a quorum should cover only meetings that are
somehow authorized by the board. Instead, the manual, as well as
subsequent editions thereof(collectively, the Sunshine Manual), embraced
the per se board meeting rule as if it was the law and cited Doran, Times
Publishing Co., Berns, Canney, and Hough, or some combination thereof,
as the sole authority for such a position. 150 The press (which has also funded

149. 2000 GoVERNMENT IN TIIE SUNSHINE MANUAL 22.
150. In the 2000 Edition of the Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual, the per se board
meeting rule was stated as follows: "The Sunshine Law applies to any gathering,whether formal
or casual, of two or more members of the same board or commission to discuss some matter on
which foreseeable action will be taken by the public board or commission." See Bd. of Pub.
Instruction of Broward County v. Doran,224 So. 2d 693,698 (Fla. 1969).

•••

It is the how and the why officials decided to so act which interests the public,not merely the
final decision. Thus, the court recognized in Williams:
Every thought,as well as every affirmative act,of a public official as it relates
to and is within the scope of his official duties,is a matter of public concern; and
it is the entire [d]ecision-making process that the legislature intended to affect
by the enactment of the statute before us.
Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams,222 So. 2d 470,473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) and supra note 48. This
quotation from Williams was the reasoning used by the Second District Court in interpreting
"official acts" not what constituted a board meeting. Id.
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all later editions of the Sunshine Manual) had found a willing ally in the
State Attorney General, and in their zeal, they overreached.151
6. 1979
In Blackford v. School Board of Orange County, 152 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal held that orchestrated private individual meetings, carried
out in rapid succession over two day periods on five different occasions
between the School Superintendent and each ofthe School Board members
to discuss a proposed school closure, constituted de facto meetings of the
board, in violation of the Sunshine Law.153 The tacit agreement of the board
as a whole to this consensus-making arrangement was obvious.
In Krause v. Reno,154 the Third District Court ofAppeal (the progenitor
of Hough) held that the city manager, as an "agency" of the city, created a
"board" when he established an advisory group to screen applicants for the
position of policy chief and that the meetings of such "board" were subject
to the Sunshine Law. 155 The District Court reasoned that the advisory group
was made an integral part of the City Manager's decision making process.
In reaching its decision, the District Court quoted liberally from the Adkins
dicta in Doran and Gradison. 156 The District Court summarized, "[i]t is
beyond doubt that the Statute is to be construed liberally in favor of open
government. "IS7 The District Court then listed all the benefits of open
government without any countervailing considerations that the Legislature
may have taken into account in failing to repudiate Turk, or in requiring that
the gatherings covered by the statute be "meetings of the board or
commission" of the governmental unit.158
Be that as it may, this case, as well as many others cited erroneously for
the per se board meeting rule, ultimately relies on the delegation of
151. See also Askew v. Green, 348 So. 2d 1245, 1246-48(Fla. !st DCA 1977)(denying the
State Attorney General's challenge to the validity ofa county ordinance requiring reimbursement
of attorney fees incurred by county officials acquitted of Sunshine Law violations).
152. 375 So. 2d 578(Fla 5th DCA 1979).
153. Id. at 580-81.
154. 366 So. 2d 1244(Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
155. Id. at 1252.
156. Id. at 1248, 1250.
157. Id. at 1250. Note the shift in the presumption from a liberal construction in favor ofthe
public as in Board ofPublic Instruction ofBroward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 697(Fla.
1969), to a presumption in favor ofopen government. Such a shift helps undermine any thoughtful
consideration of any countervailing benefits the public derived from the balance struck by the
Legislature that allowed for private consultation between board members outside of board
meetings, a sort of"don't confuse me with the facts" approach to the Sunshine Law.
158. Krause, 366 So. 2d at 1250-51.
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authority rationale for concluding that the group in question was, in fact,
acting as a duly authorized public collegial body of the governmental unit
However intrusive and beyond the pale the opinion may seem to carry the
Sunshine Law under the banner of the delegation of authority rationale, and
into the collective decision making processes of the executive and
administrative side of government, there is at least some basis for
concluding that the group subjected to the Sunshine Law is acting either as,
or on behalf of, a collegial public body.
7. 1980
In 1980, an updated version of the Sunshine Manual (renamed
Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual) was published and included in the
State Attorney General's Annual Report. 159 The Attorney General
proclaimed in a cover letter that, "[N]owhere is 'Government in the
Sunshine' brighter than in Florida ... where courts have avoided restrictive
interpretations that would have weakened them."160 He then touted the
"champions of open government," court decisions that have "beamed
sunshine to the farthest recesses of government and steadfastly nullified
efforts to get around them by delegation of authority and other devices" and
"a working environment that fosters a vigorous free press."161
Given this clarion call, any attempt to question the wisdom, much less
validity, of the per se board meeting rule was bound to encounter the
concerted opposition of both the State Attorney General and the press. The
issue thus laid dormant, while the courts and State Attorney General pushed
the Sunshine Law in new directions, based on the more defensible line of
reasoning embedded in the delegation of authority rationale. At the same
time, the courts continued to perpetuate the anomaly of confidential staff
advice (given also by the executive branch) permitted under the negative per
se board meeting rule. But deep divisions still smouldered in the Florida
Supreme Court over the reach of the Sunshine Law.
8. 1981
In Tolar v. School Board ofLiberty County,162 the First District Court
of Appeal held that a decision to abolish the position of "director of
administration," though made in violation of the Sunshine Law at the home
of the School Superintendent-elect at a non-public gathering attended by a
159.
160.
161.
162.

1980 FLA. AlT'YGEN. ANN. REP. 5.

Id. cover letter from Att'y Gen.
Id. at 5-6.

363 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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majority of the School Board members, was validated at a subsequent
school board meeting held in compliance with the Sunshine Law, where the
affected employee was present and given an opportunity to be heard. 163
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that holding in a 5-2
opinion, with Justice Adkins dissenting. 164
Since a quorum of the board members necessarily attended the
questioned meeting in Tolar, the Florida Supreme Court again left to
another day the decision of whether an unauthorized meeting of less than
a quorum of the members of the governing body came within the purview
of the Sunshine Law. However, a concurring opinion in Tolar, approved by
three justices, suggests that these justices were not even sure that the
meeting with the Superintendent-elect was violative of the Sunshine Law.
The concurring opinion stated:
Justice Adkins remains the strong judicial voice in Florida in support
of an unadulterated Sunshine Law, and it is difficult indeed to
disagree with the principles he so articulately advances. I do so here,
however, cautiously, out of a belief that he has overcharacterized the
private meetings involved in this case by calling them "secret
sessions" of the board, and that the ostensible reach of his
characterization would bar all private communications with and
among public officials on a collegial body. 165

•••

The record before us does not indicate that the superintendent-elect
of Liberty County convened the school board expressly to discuss
abolition of the position Tolar held as director of administration or
to transfer Tolar to Briston Elementary School ... To the extent
that Justice Adkins implies that a public official cannot communicate
ideas to her supervisory board except by convening or attending a
public meeting, I must respectfully disagree and suggest that there
is no legislative history to indicate that the public meeting law was
designed to so restrict public officials in the performance of their
duties. 166

163. Id.

164. Tolar v. Sch. Bd. of Liberty County, 398 So. 2d 427,429 (Fla 1981).
165. Id. at 429.

166. Id.
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In his dissent, Justice Adkins quoted liberally from his past dicta in
Doran and Berns, and cited Wolfton for its holding that upheld a criminal
indictment 167 and Krause for all the public good that is served by the
Sunshine Law. 168 In his peroration, Justice Adkins conjured up machinations
which hinged on a collaborative undertaking of at least a quorum of the
board:
The important question is not whether a formal meeting was held,
but whether the members of the Board had a nonpublic meeting
dealing with any matters on which foreseeable actions might be
taken. This Court should never place the stamp of approval on
individual gatherings wherein public officials, regardless of good
intentions, reach decisions in private on matters which may
foreseeably effect the public. It is elementary that the officials can
not do indirectly what they are prevented from doing directly.
Under the reasoning ofthe majority, any board or commission could
have informal meetings in which each member could commit himself
to some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken. This could
be done in the absence ofthe public and without giving the public an
opportunity to be heard. The ultimate action of the entire board in
public meeting would merely be an affirmation ofthe various secret
boardmeetings, so this would not be in violation ofthe Government
in the Sunshine Law.
The bright rays ofthe sunshine law have not been dimmed, they have
been obliterated. We now have to rely upon the good faith of public
officials to continue public meetings and avoid the presumption of
"hanky-panky" which flows from "secret sessions." 169
Notwithstanding the State Attorney General's categorical assertion of the
per se board meeting rule, the concurring and dissenting opinions continued
to reveal considerable uncertainty as to the reach.ofthe Sunshine Law. Yet,
even here, it is by no means clear that Justice Adkins would apply the
Sunshine Law to one-on-one consultations which are not orchestrated by
at least a quorum of the board.

167. Id. at 431 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 431-32 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
169. Tolar, 398 So. 2d at 432 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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9. 1983
In Wood v. Marston, 170 the Florida Supreme Court held that a university
search-and-screen committee of faculty, charged to assist in the selection
of a college dean and appointed by the university President as required by
the university's constitution, was a board or commission under the Sunshine
Law and that meetings of such a committee were therefore subject to the
Sunshine Law. 171 In reaching its decision the Florida Supreme Court
enunciated board principles underlying the Sunshine Law:
We note that the Sunshine Law was enacted in the public interest to
protect the public from "closed door" politics and, as such, the law
must be broadly construed to effect its remedial and protective
purpose. This Court has consistently refused to permit governmental
entities to carry out decision-making functions outside the law.172
Again, Wood is not on point because it rests on the proposition that the
decision making authority of the President of the university (the power to
reject applicants) was delegated to the committee. 173 A broad attack against
"closed door politics" does not overcome the statutory mandate that the
meeting be a meeting of the governing body. 174 As noted in the italicized
language quoted above, the focus is on actions taken by the "governmental
entities." This necessarily excludes actions taken by government officials
who cannot rationally be deemed acting on behalf of the entity that is the
source of their authority. 175
In Marston v. Wood, 116 the First District Court of Appeal held that the
search and screening committee was not subject to the Sunshine Law
because it functioned like staff, which the Florida Supreme Court held in
Occidental Chemical Co. 117 were not subject to the Sunshine Law. 178 In
reversing the District Court of Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

442 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1983).

Id. at 939.
Id.

at 938 (emphasis added).

See id.

FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2001).
Wood, 442 So. 2d at 939.
425 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336,341 (Fla. 1977).
Marston, 425 So. 2d at 585.
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distinguished that case by stating that the "privileged function of staff is to
inform and advise the decision-maker" and that "the delegation issue was
not properly before the Court." 179
In Wood, the Florida Supreme Court also dispelled, once and for all, the
notion that remoteness in the decision making process may relieve a group
from the requirements of the Sunshine Law. 180 The Florida Supreme Court
held that such a consideration (possibly due to some Adkins dicta in earlier
cases about "deliberations just short of ceremonial acceptance") 181 is not
relevant if the group has been delegated any decision making authority, no
matter how many steps have to be taken before the matter discussed by the
group comes up for form.al action. 182
The author agrees that the nature of the deliberations between board
members (beyond whether they relate to a matter likely to come before the
board) should be irrelevant. 183 In other words, whether the discussion be
remote or just short of ceremonial acceptance, preliminary or climatic,
binding or nonbinding on the parties involved, should have no bearing on
the question of whether they give rise to a board meeting. 184 That is an
impossible line to draw, as the Florida Supreme Court rightly concluded. 185
But just because, practically speaking, the continuum of board
deliberations (from inception to a point just short of form.al action) cannot
be subdivided with any reasonable certainty, it does not follow that
workable boundaries cannot be set through a definition of "meeting" that
respects the distinction the Sunshine Law necessarily draws between board
member discussions which occur at a board meeting, and those which occur
outside of board meetings. Three versions of such a definition are proposed
at the conclusion of this Article.
10. 1984

In Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Authority, 186 the Florida Supreme Court held
in a bond validation proceeding that the Sunshine Law did not apply tojoint
bond financing discussions between a governing body member of one

179. Wood, 442 So. 2d at 940.
180. Id. at 941.
181. See supra text accompanying note 77 Gust short of ceremonial acceptance quote).
182. Wood, 442 So. 2d at 940-41 (making essentially the same point in deciding when
"official acts" take place). See also Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470,474 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1969).
183. Wood, 442 So. 2d at 940-41.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 461 So. 2d 72 (Fla 1984).
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governmental unit and the governing body member of a different
governmental unit.187 Justice Adkins, who wrote the opinion, said:
[The] gatherings do not rise to the level of decision-making which is
required to violate the act.The record does show that some private
discussions occurred where the stadium financing was mentioned.
However, since no two individuals who were members of the same
governing body were present at any one of these discussions, no
decision-making official acts could occur that would violate the
act. 188
This, of course, is not a holding that the Sunshine Law, per se, applies to
discussions between two or more board or commission members of a single
governmental unit - only that, absent such discussions (or the delegation
of board decision making authority to a single member), one cannot even
get to the issue of whether the Sunshine Law applies.189 The logic of such
a negative per se board meeting rule cannot be challenged.
11.1985
In Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 190 the Florida Supreme Court
held in a 5-2 decision that, notwithstanding the holding in Bassett v.
Braddock,191 meetings between the city council and its attorney over
pending litigation were subject to the Sunshine Law. 192 The Florida
Supreme Court relied heavily on intervening legislation which spelled out
the conditions under which such meetings were exempt from the Sunshine
Law. 193 The Florida Supreme Court held that those conditions were not
satisfied. As for Bassett, the Florida Supreme Court said:
We agree that much of our rationale in Bassett would appear to
support the proposition that private consultations are permitted with
attorneys representing governmental bodies in pending litigation.
Indeed, we went so far as to comment that "where the negotiator is
an attorney that certainly he is entitled to consult with the Board on
matters regarding preliminary advices." Despite the broadness of
187. Id. at 75.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985).
191. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
192. Neu, 462 So. 2d at 823.
193. Id. at 824-25.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBUC POUCY

250

(Vol.13

such language, our decision was restricted to and rested on what we
saw to be a constitutional exception to the Sunshine Law, to wit: the
article I, section 6 right of public employees to bargain
collectively. 194
In response to the argument that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Sunshine Law is an overly broad construction of the statute, the
Court said:
Petitioners' broadest argument, and the one most fervently pressed,
is that this Court's decisions in Doran and Berns have effectively
strangled the political process in Florida and forced political bodies
and officials to evade the Sunshine Law, as interpreted, in order to
make the political process function. On this point, petitioners'
arguments go beyond the issue here of consultations with attorneys
on pending litigation to ask that we recede completely from Doran
and Berns. Essentially, petitioners would have us read section
286.011 narrowly and hold that it applies only to climatic meetings
where official actions and acts are approved by the governing body.
We have recently articulated why we will not adopt such a reading
in Wood, and will not repeat the reasons here. 195
As previously stated, criticism herein of the per se board meeting rule does
not tum on its application to nonclimatic meetings of the board, but rather
on the fact that the rule embraces one-on-one consultations and other
nonquorum gatherings that cannot reasonably be construed as board
meetings. The Florida Supreme Court need not retreat at all from its prior
holdings to correct this misconception of the law.
In Deerfield Beach Publishing, Inc. v. Robb, 196 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint seeking
injunctive relief arising from alleged discussions between the mayor and
other commissioners. 197 The grounds for dismissal were that the plaintiff
refused to identify the other commissioners and the dates on which the
discussions occurred. 198 The District Court held that such identification is
critical to a claim for injunctive relief, noting that the Sunshine Law was
"never intended to become a millstone around the neck of the public's

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
530 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
Id. at 511.
Id.
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representatives," 199 and cited Mitchell for the negative per se board meeting
rule.200
As far as the author is concerned, the negative per se board meeting rule
is unassailable but vastly different from a rule that ipso facto treats as a
board meeting any gathering of two or more board members, whether or
not they have any authority to act on behalf of the board. It is not enough
that board business is discussed at such a gathering. That merely qualifies
the kind of board meeting which, absent an exemption, is subject to the
open government requirements. However, one does not get to that issue
unless the threshold requirement is first met that the gathering in fact
constitutes a board meeting.
12. Attorney General Opinions: 1985-1990
During the same period of time the courts were side stepping the per se
board meeting rule, the State Attorney General was issuing a flurry of
opinions that continued to accept the rule as a given and then addressed
how it applied at the edges. In every case, the State Attorney General cited
as authority for the rule the Hough case or one or more of the litany of
Florida Supreme Court cases that contained (1) at best dicta of Justice
Adkins arguably in support of such a rule, but ofproblematic value, and (2)
in the Berns holding, dicta disowned by a majority of the Court.201 In most
199. Id.
200. Id. See also City ofSunrise v. News & Sun-Sentinel Co., 542 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989), where the Fourth District Court ofAppeal held that a meeting between the mayor and a
city employee was not a meeting under the Sunshine Law. Id. The District Court reasoned that the
mayor had not delegated any ofhis decision making authority to the employee. Id. at 1356. The
District Court added that, absent such delegation ofauthority and as the District Court had stated
in Deerfield Beach Publishing, Inc., one cannot even get to the question ofwhether there was a
meeting under the Sunshine Law unless at least two public officials had met. Id. at 1354-56.
Again, the point must be stressed that just because there cannot be a board meeting unless at least
two board members meet( absent delegation ofdecision making authority), it does not follow that
there is a board meeting whenever two or more board members meet.
201. See, e.g., 36 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen.(1985); 26 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen.(l 990)(Council member
may discuss in private council business with mayor, so long as mayor is not acting as intermediary
nor authorized to break a tie, nor delegated any council decision making authority over the subject
matter); 23 Fla Op. Att'y Gen. (1986) (Incumbent is subject to Sunshine Law ifhe presents, at
an election campaign function, his ideas about pending council matters in the presence ofother
council members even though the members do not discuss the ideas); 34 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen.
(1987)( Council member may talk in private to a planning commission member so long as decision
making authority was not delegated to council member and council member was not acting as a
liaison for council or any smaller group thereof); 23 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1989) (Commissioner
may send memo to other commissioners about pending matters so long as recipient does not
respond until public meeting); and 17 Fla Op. Att'y Gen. (1990) (Single member may
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opinions, the State Attorney General also continued to cite Times
Publishing Co. as additional authority, in apparent ignorance that the
Second District Court of Appeal, in fashioning its own definition of a
meeting, held exactly to the contrary. 202 Of course, Tanzler and Jones were
ignored.
C. Constitutional Amendments
While the courts and the State Attorney General were interpreting the
Sunshine Law during the twenty years following its adoption, bills from
time to time were being introduced in the Legislature that either expressly
included the Legislature and its committees (and in some instance,
individual members thereof) within the ambit of the Sunshine Law (or a
rewrite thereof) or (as an amendment to the State Constitution) embraced
all state and local public bodies. 203 With one exception only, none of the
bills made it to the floor of either chamber for a vote. 204 In addition, in
1978, Florida's Constitution Revision Committee proposed to the voters an
amendment that read as follows:
SECTION 25. Open meetings. -No person shall be denied access
to any meeting at which official acts are to be taken by any
nonjudicial collegial public body in the state or by persons acting
together on behalf of such a public body. The legislature may
exempt meetings by general law when it is essential to accomplish
overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy interests. 205
This amendment was proposed in order to elevate the Sunshine Law to
constitutional status and to include the Legislature within its ambit. 206 The
italicized portion of the proposed amendment supports the contention in

be authorized to discuss garbage contract with vendor in private so long as member serves as factfinder with no delegated authority to accept or reject contract provisions).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45 (Times Puhl 'g Co. holding about what is a
meeting).
203. Thomas R. Mcswain, The Sun Rises on the Florida Legislature: The Constitutional
Amendment on Open Legislative Meetings, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307 (1991).
204. Id. at 329. That bill was passed in the House in 1975. It originally subjected "meetings
of, between, or among the government, the lieutenant governor, members of the cabinet, and/or
members of the legislature" to open meeting requirements, but was amended in committee to
exclude meetings among individual legislators and meetings among individual legislators and
officials in the executive branch. Id.
205. Id. at 322 (quoting Fla. HB 186, § 1 (1975) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. §
286.011(1)) (emphasis added).
206. Id.
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this Article that the Sunshine Law can apply to a meeting among members
of the same public body only if they have authority at such meeting to act
on behalf of that body. 207 The proposed amendment was rejected by the
voters on November 6, 1978, by a vote of 1,512,106 to 623,703.208
Following the 1988 legislative session, Common Cause of Florida and
the Florida Legislative Committee began a petition drive for a constitutional
open government amendment that applied to the Legislature only and that
defmed a meeting as "a prearranged gathering of two or more members,
either to take formal action or to agree to take formal action later,"209 a
more circumscribed version of the per se board meeting rule. Although the
petition drive failed, it provided impetus for both chambers of the
Legislature to strengthen their open meeting rules to apply to not only their
legislative sessions and meetings of its committees but also to meetings
among its legislators. Again it is significant that both chambers, from the
outset, distinguished between meetings of its committees and meetings
among the legislators, a distinction which, of course, the per se board
meeting rule disregards.
The above distinction was ultimately embedded in an amendment to the
State Constitution (the "1990 Constitutional Amendment") that was
approved by the Legislature during the 1990 legislative session and by the
voters at the November 3, 1990 general election. 210 Section 4(e) ofthe 1990
Constitutional Amendment provided in relevant part:
The rules of procedure of each house shall provide that all
legislative committee and subcommittee meetings of each house, and
joint conference committee meetings, shall be open and noticed to
the public. The rules ofprocedure of each house shall further provide
that all prearranged gatherings, between more than two members of
the legislature, or between the governor, the president of the senate,
or the speaker of the house of representatives, the purpose of which
is to agree upon formal legislative action that will be taken at a

207. Id.
208. Id. at 323 (citing Div. of Elections, Dep't of State, Tabulation of Official Votes, Fla.
Gen. Elections 25 (1978)).
209. Id. at 337.
210. The amendment was approved 2,795,784 to 392,323. Div. Of Elections, Dep't of State,
State of Florida General Election Returns, Nov. 6, 1990 at 5 ( l 990). Mcswain attributes the 1990
Amendment to an uproar caused by key legislators allegedly agreeing in secret with lobbyists to
support a special interest tax proposal. McSwain, supra note 203, at 307.
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subsequent time, or at which formal legislative action is taken,
regarding pending legislation or amendments, shall be reasonably
open to the public.211
Under the logic of the per se board meeting rule, the distinction drawn by
the Legislature between committee meetings and meetings between
legislators would be obliterated. For, if only two committee members (not
constituting a quorum of the committee) met by chance and discussed a bill
pending before the committee, then ipso facto, under the rule, that
discussion would be a meeting of the committee regardless of whether the
meeting of the two legislators was sanctioned by the committee. In short,
the rule would trump the two or more/prearranged meeting test so carefully
crafted by the Legislators. 212 Needless to say, no one has ever suggested
that such a one-on-one consultation would be treated as a meeting of the
committee.
Within a year after adoption ofthe 1990 Constitutional Amendment, the
Florida Supreme Court held in Locke v. Hawkes2 13 that the Legislature was
not subject to the Public Records Act. 214 This opinion triggered a movement
to elevate to constitutional status not only the Public Records Act (making
it also applicable to the Legislature), but also the Sunshine Law.215 The
State Attorney General Bob Butterworth, led the charge, and proposed the
following open meeting amendment:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, no
person shall be denied access to any meeting at which official acts
are to be taken by any collegial public body in the state or bypersons
acting together on behalfofsuch a public body, with the exception
of jury and grand jury deliberations. The legislature may exempt
meetings by general law when the exemption serves an identifiable
public purpose that is sufficiently compelling to override the public
policy of open government.216
This provision was almost identical to the language proposed in 1977 by the
Constitutional Revision Commission and retained the distinction in the 1977
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

FLA. CONST. art. III,§ 4(e) (2001).

Id.
595 So. 2d 32 (Fla 1992).
Id. at 34, 37.

Patricia A. Gleason & Joslyn Wilson, The Florida Constitution's Open Government
Amendments; Article I. Section 24 and Article /II, Section 4(e) - Let the Sunshine In!, 18 NOVA
L. REV. 973, at 977-78 (1994).
216. Mcswain, supra note 203, at 368 (emphasis added).
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proposal between meetings at which official acts are to be taken by the
collegial public body and meetings at which persons are acting together on
behalf of such a body.217 It is hard to believe that any court would infer from
such language that consultation between two or more board members who
have no authority to act on behalf of the board is nevertheless deemed to be
acting together either as, or on behalf of, the board. This proposed
amendment offered no solace to any proponents ofthe per se board meeting
rule.
Ultimately the constitutional open meeting amendment, submitted to and
approved by the voters in the November 3, 1992 general election (the
"1992 Constitutional Amendment"), substantially tracked the operative
provisions of the Sunshine Law. It read in relevant part:
Section 24. Access to public records and meetings.
All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of
state government or of any collegial public body of a county,
municipality, school district, or special district, at which official acts
are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be
transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public.� .218
The italicized language embraced the interpretation of "official acts" in the
Sunshine Law adopted by the courts but left an intriguing negative inference
that the "official acts" language found in the Sunshine Law, and retained as
a separate test in the 1992 Constitutional Amendment, had a different and
presumably more narrow meaning. Although the courts in subsequent cases
have never addressed this issue, they have in two cases stated that the
amendment is substantially identical to the Sunshine Law.219
Presumably, any advocate of the per se board meeting rule will argue
that since the rule was assumed by the State Attorney General to be the law
under the Sunshine Law at the time the 1992 Constitutional Amendment
was adopted, the rule was somehow subsumed in the amendment. This
Article has hopefully dispelled the illusion that the rule was then in fact the
law. On one side of the ledger we have (1) the quixotic Hough case that
invokes an ethereal "spirit, intent and purpose" (a favorite rationale of

217. See supra text accompanying note 205.
218. FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 24(b-c) (2001) (emphasis added).
219. See Zorc v. City of Vero Beach, 722 So. 2d 891, 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Monroe
County v. Pigeon Key Historical Park, Inc., 647 So. 2d 857, 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding that
the 1992 Constitutional Amendment "does not create a new legal standard by which to judge
Sunshine Law cases").
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activist judges intent on overcoming statutory constraints), and (2) the
stretched dicta of Justice Adkins in Berns miscited as a Florida Supreme
Court holding by the State Attorney General.220 On the other side of the
ledger we have (I) the statutory mandate that the Sunshine Law only apply
to "meetings of the board or commission" (now a constitutional mandate),
(2) the holding in Times Publishing Co. that a meeting under the Sunshine
Law is a joint assemblage at which formal action could be taken, and (3) the
holding in Tanz/er that the Sunshine Law does not apply to an informal
meeting of less than a quorum of city members with no authority to take
action on behalf of the council.221
At worst, the law was unsettled as to whether the Sunshine Law
countenanced a per se board meeting rule. At best, not even Justice Adkins
intended such a rule to become the law, as evidenced by the fact that even
his most extreme statements about the meeting of two or more public
officials were invariably tied to the actions of a committee that may not
have the power to bind the board as a whole, but was clearly authorized by
the board to receive testimony and make recommendations or otherwise act
on behalf of the board in the preliminary stages of the decision making
process. 222
After taking into account the thrust of the 1990 Constitutional
Amendment that clearly set forth a narrowed version of the per se board
meeting rule separate and apart from meetings oflegislative committees and
subcommittees, one can only infer from the failure to draw a similar
distinction in the 1992 Constitutional Amendment that the Legislature never
intended to deviate from a common sense meaning of the term "meetings
of any collegial public body," as distinguished from non-board sanctioned
meetings among less than a quorum ofits members. A per se board meeting
rule makes no more sense than would a comparable per se committee
meeting rule under the 1990 Constitutional Amendment.223
In short, when the Legislature intended under the 1990 Constitutional
Amendment the equivalent of a per se board meeting rule, it said so in
separate, clear and unmistakable language that recognized that meetings
between individual legislators are necessarily a universe broader than, and
different from any committee meetings. At the same time, the Legislature
220. See supra note 88 (Att'y Gen. miscite of Berns).
221. Jones v. Tanzler, 234 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams,
222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 70 & 122, and supra note 136 (examples of Adkins'
focus on committees).
223. McSwain, supra note 203. Nowhere in the rather detailed account of the legislative
history surrounding the 1990 Constitutional Amendment is there any indication that the
Legislature was concerned about a per se committee meeting rule. Id.
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rationalized the rule so as to permit (1) confidential one-on-one
consultations about legislative matters, (2) unlimited private discussions
between more than two legislators about legislative matters that did not
constitute formal legislative action, nor an agreement to take such action,
and (3) unfettered private discussions at chance meetings oflegislators.224
Surely ifthe Florida Supreme Court is not willing to acknowledge that
a non-board sanctioned meeting among less than a quorum of the board
members cannot logically be treated as a meeting of that board, the
Legislature has the power to say so without being in conflict with the 1992
Constitutional Amendment.225
D. Post-Amendment Developments
In the cases that followed the 1990 and 1992 Constitutional
Amendment, the courts further extend the reach ofthe Sunshine Law under
the delegation ofauthority rationale. 226 As previously noted, such reasoning
is at least consistent with the notion advanced in this Article that a similar
linkage to the governing body must be established before any meeting
among less than a quorum ofits members can be treated as a board meeting
under the Sunshine Law and the 1992 Constitutional Amendment. No
court, however, addressed the validity of the per se board meeting rule,
though the State Attorney General continued to embrace the rule as if it
were the law as he spun fine distinctions that in most instances tried to
mitigate some of the rule's more onerous effects.
One line from the State Attorney General's Opinion attempted to
distinguish between two or more board members expressing their opinions
about board matters at a larger gathering (e.g., candidate's forum,
community development board, and other city board meetings) and
discussing or debating those matters among themselves at the gathering.
According to the Attorney General, the Sunshine Law only applied if the
224. Once the State Attorney General and the District Court in the Hough case crossed the
statutory boundary of a board meeting, they necessarily assumed the role of the Legislature in
drawing new lines comparable in specificity to the parameters the Legislature drew for itself in
the 1990 Constitutional Amendment.
225. At the very least, the Legislature can clarify the Sunshine Law so that its remedial
provisions (particularly the criminal sanctions) are tied to a reasonable interpretation of a board
meeting.
226. Mem'l Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373, 373-74 (Fla.
1999) (holding that a private nonprofit organization that leases and operates a hospital from the
hospital mxing authority is subject to Sunshine Law and Public Records Act); Silver Express Co.
v. Miami-Dade Coll., 691 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that a committee
established by college's purchasing agentto screen contract proposals is subject to Sunshine Law).
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board members went beyond merely expressing their opinions and engaged
in such "interaction."227 The Attorney General applied his "no interaction"
rationale to memoranda on board matters circulated by and among board
members. The Sunshine Law only applied if memoranda either solicited a
response or, worse yet, was in response to another board member
memorandum.228
In other opinions, the State Attorney General applied the negative per
se board meeting rule to allow the board to authorize a single board
member to speak in private about board matters to one or more than one
non-board member as long as the board did not delegate to the board
member or the non-board members any decision making authority of the
board.229 But sometimes the absurd logic of the per se board meeting rule

227. 5 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1992). Discussions between an incumbent candidate and a non
incumbent candidate are not subject to the Sunshine Law so long as no "interaction" takes place
between the two. This opinion departed from an earlier opinion that treated such presentations as
tantamount "to discussions." 23 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1986). The Attorney General later expanded
the "no interaction" exception by concluding that two or more members of a commission could
serve as panelists at a private forum and express their opinions on commission matters so long as
they deferred until the board meeting discussions among themselves of these issues. 62 Fla. Op.
Att'y Gen.(1994). The Attorney General again extended the "no interaction" exception by opining
that a meeting of the city commission subject to the Sunshine Law does not occur if the
commissioners attend a meeting of the city's community development board established by the
commission to review proposed ordinances and express their support or opposition to an ordinance
so long as the commissioners do not engage in debate or discussions with each other at the
meeting. 68 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (2000).
228. 21 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (2001); 35 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1996). In the 2001 opinion, the
Attorney General, perhaps sensing the unworkability of the "no interaction" exception, suggested
that the better practice would be for the commissioners to refrain from submitting position papers
and simply discuss their positions at an open meeting. Position papers should be used to clarify
each commissioner's preliminary thinking on a board matter so that the discussion on the matter
at a subsequent open meeting can be more to the point and productive. 20 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen.
(200 I) (Communicating factual background information from one board member to another via
e-mail is not subject to the Sunshine Law, so long as it does not result in the exchange of
member's comments or other responses that would require council action.).
229. 78 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1993)(Chairman ofa community development agency could not
discuss in private with any other commission member the terms of employment of applicants for
executive director, whether or not such discussions were authorized by the commission. The
commission could, however, authorize the chairman to discuss in private such terms with the
applicants but only if the chairman was not also authorized to accept or reject on behalf of the
commission any contract options, whether or not the commission had final authority to accept or
reject the contract.); 52 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1997) (School board member and a college board
member may discuss the purchase ofproperty for joint use by the school district and college when
the decision to acquire the property is not a joint decision but rests solely with the school board
and when neither party has any decision making authority).
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cannot be mitigated, as was the case inAttorney General Opinion 2000-08,
February 9, 2000, in which the Attorney General opined that the Sunshine
Law applied each time two or more fire commissioners from one fire and
rescue district attended a county-wide association of seventeen such
districts if the commissioners should discuss common concerns that may
come before their district board.
The per se board meeting rule underpinned each of the Attorney General
Opinions discussed above, and in each opinion the authority for the rule
remained the suspect mantra of Doran, Times Publishing Co., Berns,
Canney, and Hough, or some combination thereof.230
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Teaching Points

The foregoing review of Florida Supreme Court and District Courts of
Appeal decisions, and State Attorney General Opinions, can best be
summarized as establishing the following points:
I. The language of the Sunshine Law clearly requires a meeting of the
governmental unit's governing body, and no Florida Supreme Court case
has held that that requirement can be met if the meeting takes place among
less than a quorum of the members of the governing body and is not
sanctioned by the governing body as a whole. Only the Third District Court
of Appeal, in Hough, held differently by in effect adopting the per se board
meeting rule as the law.231 The Second District Court of Appeal, in Times
Publishing Co., and the First District Court of Appeal, in Tanzler, held to
the contrary. 232
2. Jones, Berns, and Occidental Chemical Co. indicate that the Florida
Supreme Court consciously deferred until another day whether, and under
what circumstances, a meeting of less than a quorum of the board is

230. 52 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1997); 8 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (2000). The Attorney General cited

Krause as authority for the per se board meeting rule, and in 1998, Gradison was cited as
additional authority for the rule. 60 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. (1998); see supra text accompanying notes
122 & 154 (discussion ofGradison and Krause cases).

231. Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
232. Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Jones v. Tanzler,
234 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
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nevertheless a meeting of the board under the Sunshine Law. 233 The
delegation ofauthority logic ofGradison, Wood, and Memorial Hospital,234
however, is that a board meeting will include any meeting conducted by a
committee appointed by the board, as Eroperly held by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in the Bigelow case.2 5
3. Bassett, Tolar, and Occidental Chemical Co. show that the Florida
Supreme Court was rightly troubled by the near impossible line drawing
problems and real world absurdities that arise once the Sunshine Law is
expanded beyond the borders ofthe statute to include non-board sanctioned
gatherings among less than a quorum of the members of a governing body.
4. Neither the holding in Doran,236 nor the superfluous dicta in
Canney, 237 nor the negative per se board meeting rule affirmed in Rowe,238
provides any precedent for upholding the per se board meeting rule. Yet
Hough relies upon Doran and the dicta in Canney, together with the
unsubstantiated "purpose, intent and spirit" ofthe Sunshine Law, as its sole
authority for adopting this rule as the law in Florida.239
5. The real winners under the per se board meeting rule are non-elected
staff and lobbyists who can privately pursue their agendas with each board
member and thereby influence board decisions as long as each board
member is left in the dark as to the thinking of the other board members on
the subject until the board meeting.
6. The per se board meeting rule has spawned some tortured
distinctions (e.g., the speak, listen but don't discuss "no
interaction" out) in a futile attempt to loosen the straight jacket that binds
all public officials subjected to the rule.
7. The State Attorney General, under cover of the Sunshine Manual,
has disregarded the foregoing and continues to perpetuate the myth that the
per se board meeting rule is the law in Florida.
B. The Need For A Rational Bright Line
Powerful arguments can be made, starting with the language of the
statute and the State Constitution, that the Sunshine Law should not be
233. Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91 (Fla 1970); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 1971); Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 122 (Gradison), 173 (Wood) and 226 (Memorial

Hospital).

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. App. 1974).
Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
Canney v. Bd. of Private Educ. of Alachua County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1984).
Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. App. 1973).
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construed to apply towards unsanctioned meetings of less than a quorum
of the members of the governing body. The key point is that if such
meetings are not authorized by at least a quorum of the governing body,
they cannot fairly and reasonably be construed as meetings ofthe governing
body as required by the statute. Justice Dekle's quotation from Fine v.
Morari240 in his dissent in Gradison says it all:
In construing or interpreting the words of a statute it should be
borne in mind that the courts have no function of legislation, and
seek only to ascertain the will of the Legislature. The courts may not
imagine an intent and bend the letter of the act to that intent, much
less, says the Maryland court, "can we indulge in the license of
striking out and inserting and remodeling with the view of making
the letter express an intent which the statute in its native form does
not evidence."241
Apart from the "plain meaning of the statute" rule of construction,
another reason for rejecting the per se board meeting rule is that it creates
insurmountable line-drawing problems that unduly inhibit private
communications between public body members. For example, under the
Sunshine Law's forseeability test, a settled business matter not likely to be
reopened may be discussed in private. 242 But how does one know that the
matter will not be raised again? Only when the formal action on the matter
commanded a unanimous vote?
A more common line-drawing problem arises concerning issues that are
not even on the board's radar screen. Take the following hypothetical: A
city commissioner may think that a vacant property should be acquired by
the city and converted into a playground, but only if the neighborhood
would support the playground and if the property is not likely to be
developed. Another commissioner lives in the neighborhood and would
provide useful insights on the issue. May the two commissioners first
discuss the matter in private before deciding whether to even approach the
board on the matter?
Questions of this nature would vanish if there were a clear rule that two
or more board members may discuss in private any potential board matters,
as long as the members involved do not collectively have the power to
240. 77 So. 533 (Fla. 1917).
241. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 480 (Fla 1974) (Dekle, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ftne, 77 So. at 536).
242. This forseeability test originated in Board ofPublic Instruction ofBroward County v.
Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 698 (Fla 1969), and has never been challenged.
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engage in such discussions on behalfof the board. If they do have such
authority, then they can simply conclude that the Sunshine Law covers all
such discussions.
Another example of a line-drawing problem is, of course, the State
Attorney General's "no-interaction" out that allows board members at
unnoticed gatherings to express their views to others in attendance on
matters pending before the board so long as they do not debate or discuss
those issues among themselves at the gathering. When does such a
prohibited interchange occur? When the board member says he disagrees
with the other board member? When the board member criticizes the
positions ofthe other board member? When the board member asks another
board member a clarifying question? Again, the niceties of permissible
expression with no interaction can be largely eliminated ifall discussions
about board matters are either allowed or prohibited under the kind ofclean
rule suggested above.
We are assured that the Sunshine Law does not apply to purely social
gatherings of board members,243 but then the State Attorney General
cautions against any such meeting that may raise suspicions, like a regular
practice ofhaving dinner together just before each regular meeting. In the
case ofthe dinner involving Aldrich, Seed, Skinner, and Tonkel, when the
District Attorney learned that all or some of the same people had dinner
together on two other occasions after a regular meeting ofthe Board (also
investigated by the State's Attorney but not found wanting), he fired off a
memorandum to all District Board trustees not to attend any more such
dinners because ofthe appearance ofimpropriety.244
Trustee Skinner is quoted in the Vero Beach Press Journal as saying
that, as a result ofthe investigation and indictments, she will not get "within
a football field's length" of any other trustee.245 Under the per se board
meeting rule, the right to socialize has a hollow ring.
C. Private One-On-One Consultations Serve the Public Interest

A common sense interpretation of the Sunshine Law and the 1992
Constitutional Amendment is that they do not peer into any potential board
matter discussions that take place between board members when there is no
reasonable basis for concluding they are acting either as, or on behalfof, the
243. See supra text accompanying note 88.
244. Memorandum from Alan Polackwich on Post Meeting Dinners to Richard R. Aldrich,
Allen Seed, and Donna Skinner (Sept. 27, 1999) (on file with author).
245. Adam Chrzan, Grand Jury: Trustees Deny Seed's Legal Fees, VERO BEACH PREss J.,
Apr. 11, 2000, at A3.
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governing body. A rule of reason which fairly implements this simple
concept is not only mandated by statute and the 1992 Constitutional
Amendment. It is also needed so that board members can effectively
function as representatives of the public.
Such a rule of reason should allow for an elected official to informally
share in confidence information with another elected official and talk
through with that person an issue which might come before the board. This
kind of one-on-one, give and take consultation is a crucial component of
governmental decision making, as any state legislator or appellate judge
(who, ofcourse, is not subject to the Sunshine Law) will readily admit. The
art of "reasoning together" cannot be exclusively practiced at a public
meeting. Any other interpretation ofthe law runs the serious risk ofmaking
elected officials pawns of lobbyists and non-elected staff who remain free
to consult in private with individual board members.
To characterize the process of reasoning together as "back room
politics" or "closed door politics" is to ignore human nature. Any elected
official who cares about an issue may well want to talk in private to other
interested parties about the matter. It is the process by which "dumb
questions" are asked without embarrassment, differences are narrowed, and
emotionally laden misunderstandings are sorted out.246 A rule that prohibits
such discourse between board members is both childish and demeaning.
Political deal-making will not be stifled by artificially limiting private
deliberations to discussions with staff, lobbyists and interested citizens who
are not members of the governing body. The deals, or understandings, will
simply be reached with those non-elected persons who have little
accountability to the public at large.
By requiring that the affected assemblages be meetings ofthe governing
body and not just of the members thereof, the Legislature (and the
electorate through the 1992 Constitutional Amendment) struck a balance,
allowing for private one-on-one and small group consultations among
members of the governing body that cannot reasonably be construed as
board meetings, and yet, imposing open meeting requirements when those
consultations do amount to board meetings. A rule of reason that respects

246. According to the local newspaper, a member of the Indian River Memorial Hospital
board of directors resigned "because of frustration with the state's open meeting law." VERO
BEACH PREss J., Jan. 6, 2002, at A7. In a letter to the board, the director said "the Sunshine Law
has thwarted the board's ability to dig in and solve problems." Id. Two quotes from the letter are
telling: "So many times I really wanted to sit down with a fellow director and discuss hospital
business,... but the possibility that we might vote on something meant we didn't do that. It would,
violate the Sunshine Law." Id. Little did the director know that he was just another casualty of a
misconception of the law that must surely discourage citizen participation in local public boards.
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such a balance should eliminate most of the line-drawing problems
discussed above. More importantly, the rule facilitates good government.
Much is made in the State Attorney General opinions of the statement
in Doran that the Sunshine Law should be liberally construed for the benefit
of the public.247 No one can quarrel with that proposition, and indeed it is
one that has been rightly embraced by the Florida courts in subsequent
opinions. However, what is missing from the equation is the clear benefit
that the public gets from the balance struck by the Legislature and the kind
of private consultations among board members that must be permitted.248
In a separate article in progress the author describes how the per se
board meeting rule was used, perhaps by well intentioned persons, to
terrorize Aldrich and Seed in a criminal proceeding. It is an ugly story of
personal animus, struggling memories ( as parties tried vainly to recall events
which at the time they occurred seemed so innocuous), paranoiac
suspicions, strong arm tactics, media angst, emotional turmoil, costly
litigation, and political revenge, all fostered in large part by the misguided
notion that the per se board meeting rule was the law.
Perhaps the havoc that the rule wrought in the lives ofAldrich and Seed
is the best argument for its rejection. A rule that penetrates so intrusively
into the unguarded private moments of board members is bound to create
paranoia, particularly if the rule becomes a sword for exacting vengeance,
no matter how justified such exaction may seem to be in the eyes of the
avengers. By limiting the Sunshine Law to board meetings, the Legislature
provided a setting for the law's application that properly puts each board
member on notice that the spotlight must be on. So focused, the board
member is more likely to choose his or her words carefully and thereafter
recall what transpired at such a meeting. A rule of reason that respects the
"board meeting" boundaries set by the Legislature and reaffirmed by the
electorate in the 1992 Constitutional Amendment greatly reduces the risk
of misunderstandings and abuse in the enforcement of the Sunshine Law.

247. See supra text accompanying note 52. One should take to heart the cautionary point
made in Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("[this]
rule of construction will not support an interpretation where 'there is neither reason nor policy
expressed in the language of the statute' to support an expansive reading of it").
248. See Moberg v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983) (for an
insightful discussion of the balance the court concluded the Minnesota Legislature struck in a
comparable open meeting law then in effect).
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D. Proposed Solutions
It is time to consign the per se board meeting rule to the graveyard of
good intentions gone awry. In its place should be a definition ofa meeting
under the Sunshine Law that ( 1) respects the statutory (and constitutional)
requirement that the meeting be "of any board or commission" ("of any
collegial public body"), (2) prohibits the governing body from
circumventing the open meeting requirement, and (3) provides a workable
bright line that does not stifle one-on-one consultations between board
members on potential board matters. Such a definition, preferred by the
author, is the following:
A "meeting" under the Sunshine Law is any gathering ofa quorum
of the members of the collegial public body, including any
committee, or subcommittee thereof, at which public business of
such body is to be transacted or discussed, and any other gathering
ofless than a quorum ofthe members intended by the public body to
circumvent the open meeting requirement by either subdividing into
smaller groups that collectively constitute a quorum or delegating to
the smaller group the authority to act on behalfofthe collegial public
body. Any one-on-one consultation or other gathering between two
or more members who are not acting on behalfofthe public body as
provided in the preceding sentence is not a "meeting" under the
Sunshine Law.
This definition, like the law that is being interpreted, strikes a balance
between the demand for open government and meaningful deliberations in
public on the one hand, and the need for effective representation of the
people on the other. Board members must be able to reason together both
in public and private settings. The proposed definition seeks to achieve that
goal while never permitting the governing body to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly.
Perhaps the same objectives can be achieved with a definition more
general in nature, such as:
A "meeting" under the Sunshine Law is any meeting oftwo or more
members ofa collegial public body at which public business ofthe
public body is discussed, provided that the members involved have
authority to engage in such discussions on behalfofthe public body.
Membership in the public body does not alone constitute such
authority.
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Such a definition aptly states the principle that there cannot logically be a
meeting ofthe board unless the board has somehow sanctioned the meeting.
However, in the author's opinion, the definition leaves too much to
interpretation.
A definition that cuts the Gordian Knot and comes closer to both the
definition found in the 1990 Constitutional Amendment, and a definition
used by a few other states,249 is as follows:
A "meeting" under the Sunshine Law is any meeting of the lesser of
(i) three or more members or (ii) a quorum ofa collegial public body
convened for the purpose ofdiscussing public business ofthe public
body. No other meeting involving any members of the public body
is a meeting of that body under the Sunshine Law.
This definition provides a brighter line by placing no open meeting
requirements on meetings between only two members of the governing
body. The definition also exempts discussions at meetings (e.g., social or
chance meetings) that are not convened for the purpose of discussing public
business. Some may view the definition as an opportunity for abuse. The
author sees in the definition the same kind of workable rough justice that
was achieved in the 1990 Constitutional Amendment covering the
Legislature. If the first more nuanced definition proposed abov.e is
unacceptable, perhaps the Florida Supreme Court or Legislature will find
this last one more fitting.
Pitted against all three proposed definitions is the illogical per se board
meeting rule, a rule born of disavowed dicta, squarely held in only one
intermediate appellate court decision that invoked the deities of "spirit,
intent and purpose" without a scintilla of supporting legislative history,
contradicted in the holdings of two other intermediate appellate courts and
perpetuated in a string of State Attorney General opinions that, charitably
speaking, misrepresented critical case law and rendered meaningless the
constraining words of the statute. That no other state has imposed the per
se board meeting rule on local govemment250 speaks volumes about whether
the rule serves any public benefit. Either the Florida Supreme Court, or the
Legislature, should set the record straight and correct a misconception of
the law that has gone unchallenged for too long. 251
249. See supra note 12 (states with three or more members test).
250. Id.
251. Probably the best way to question the validity of the per se board meeting rule in the
courts (through to the Florida Supreme Court) is a declaratory judgment action brought by a local
government unit. Joseph W. Little and Thomas Tompkins in Open Government Laws: An Insider's
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V. POSTSCRIPT
Some may undoubtedly argue that the per se board meeting rule has,
rightly or wrongly, become a part ofFlorida's culture, that most local public
officials have learned to live with the rule, and that no useful purpose would
therefore be served in raising the issue now. Why ask the Florida Supreme
Court (perhaps by way of a declaratory judgment action) to decide once
and for all whether the per se board meeting rule is the law in Florida? Why
get the Legislature involved? Why roil the press?
The answer lies in the two concerns set forth at the outset and explicated
in this Article. The per se board meeting rule ( 1) undermines effective
representative government and (2) makes a mockery of Florida's judicial
processes. Most local government officials undoubtedly support the
Sunshine Law. However, the author doubts that there are many local
officials who seriously believe that the public interest is served by a rule
which prohibits even two board members from discussing in private
potential board matters. Certainly the Legislature did not think so, as
evidenced by the 1990 Constitutional Amendment.
The per se board rule, however, is not just a bad rule. It is a bogus rule.
It is not inferable from the statutory language. It is not supported by any
legislative history. It ignores accepted cannons of statutory construction. It
thrives on a repeated misstatement of critical case law as seen in Doran,
Times Publishing Co., and Berns. It finds solace in only one definitive
appellate court holding, the bizarre Hough case. And, it disregards the two
contrary holdings found in Times Publishing Co. and Tanzler. Whether this
aberration is the product of self-righteous dissembling or atrocious legal
scholarship is a question for someone else to answer.
What is clear is that the State Attorney General and press funded
Sunshine Manual should not be allowed to decide that the per se board

View, suggest that a right of privacy argument might be an effective grounds for challenging at
least some of the more extreme applications of the open meeting laws. Joseph W. Little & Thomas
Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C. L. REV. 451 (1974-75). This
Article does not attempt to pursue that argument, largely because Article I, Section 23, of the
Florida Constitution addresses the privacy issue. It states that the right of privacy "shall not be
construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law."
FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 23. Another grounds for challenge, however, that should surely prevail when
criminal charges are brought under the per se board meeting rule, is that the defendants are denied
due process protection under the State and Federal Constitutions because the Sunshine Law does
not give adequate notice that conduct of the kind attributed to Aldrich and Seed is a violation of
the law. See 16A C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS 580; see also Brock v. Hardie, 154 So. 690 (Fla.
1934). It is, of course, the statute, not a series of advisory State Attorney General opinions, nor
the Sunshine Manual, that must provide such notice.
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meeting rule is the law in Florida That, of course, is exactly what will
happen if the Florida Supreme Court and Legislature do not address this
issue head on. As this Article shows, the legal reasoning and process by
which the per se board meeting rule has been foisted upon the citizens of
Florida is ludicrous. Neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Legislature
can allow such a situation to stand. Florida's credibility is at stake. 252

252. Getting it right takes heavy lifting by both the Legislature and the judiciary. See State
ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 398 N.W.2d 154, 165-66 (Wis. 1987) (construing legislation

that attempted to strike a balance between open government and the need for unfettered one-on
one consultation among board members); see also Mccomas v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County,
475 S.E.2d 280, 286-93 (W. Va. 1996).

